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I. INTRODUCTION 
The colossal challenges facing international finance pertain to both 
its governance system and its dual utility and speculative functions, 
which have become ever more intertwined with the advent of financial 
innovation. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a 
number of significant reforms are under way to address the second issue, 
including additional capital and liquidity requirements for banks, 
measures to battle interconnectedness in the financial sector, new resolu-
tion regimes that would allow banks to fail more easily, and stricter 
frameworks for bank supervision and monitoring of systemic risk. Yet 
limited progress has been made with respect to governance structures, 
which, thus, will be the main focus of present analysis. In this Article, I 
provide an outline of a proposal for a new model of governance for glob-
al financial markets to address most of the above challenges in a way that 
would be more effective than the preexisting regime or the architecture 
emerging as a result of the GFC. 
It is generally accepted that the global financial governance system 
is premised on four central pillars, which incorporate a diverse “legal” 
and organizational universe of rules and actors. The first pillar comprises 
international treaties, on which the most important international financial 
institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
regional development banks, and the World Bank, have been founded. 
The second pillar encompasses state-to-state contact and coordination 
groups, such as the Group of Seven most developed countries (G-7) and 
the Group of Twenty most developed countries (G-20). The third pillar is 
based on “informal,” consensus-based (soft-law) standards and structures 
(also known as Transnational Regulatory Networks (TRNs)), like the 
Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO), and other soft-law bodies led by the G-20 and the Finan-
cial Stability Board (FSB). TRNs encompass regulatory agencies and 
central banks rather than governments. The private sector is either direct-
ly represented or has direct information (and, often, significant policy 
input). The fourth pillar is the public-private sector partnership, which 
constituted, in the past, the cornerstone of the rulemaking process of this 
framework but is now much less prominent, although global financial 
services industry bodies and other organizations are still key know-how 
providers to TRN standard-setters. 
The existing complex web of TRNs, aided by IFIs and the universe 
of private-sector bodies actively involved in global financial governance, 
tend to cooperate in three governance spheres. First, TRNs and private-
sector bodies are strongly involved with the development of best practice 
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standards, normally called International Financial Standards (IFSs).1 
These are generally accepted principles, practices (acting as “default 
rules”), and guidelines, ranging from accounting standards to disclosure 
rules for securities issuers and capital adequacy requirements of banks. 
Most of the IFSs are incorporated into TRN member and nonmember 
jurisdictions through national implementation. On the other hand, both 
TRNs and IFIs are involved in monitoring compliance with the IFSs, 
either through TRN peer review procedures or through the IMF and the 
World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and reports 
on the observance of standards and codes (ROSCs). Finally, enforcement 
of cooperation is premised on bilateral and multilateral (quasi-binding) 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs). 
Most of the soft-law standards issued by the TRNs (and the IFIs) 
eventually find their way into national legislation or the European Un-
ion’s directives and regulations, giving them a particularly sharp, hard 
edge. Their de facto binding nature has recently been strengthened by 
means of increasingly rigorous peer reviews, such as those currently 
conducted by the FSB.2 Flawed regulations, including capital regulations, 
have been held to be among the principal causes of the Global Financial 
Crisis. This is a significant paradox, since a host of TRNs spent the best 
part of the last decade building standards that could prevent a financial 
crisis of the nature and magnitude of the GFC. However, the present dis-
cussion will focus more on the need to build institutional capacity and 
will provide only a cursory discussion of the advantages and flaws of 
soft-law standards.3 
Accordingly, I submit that global financial governance needs a rad-
ical enrichment of its structures and objectives in four areas: (1) effective 
supervision and monitoring of systemic risk in global markets, especially 
                                                            
 1. See Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the International Financial Architecture After the 
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81, 84 (2010); Rolf H. Weber, Mapping and Structuring 
International Financial Regulation—A Theoretical Approach, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 651, 653 
(2009). 
 2. The FSB conducts both thematic reviews and peer reviews—the results of which may be 
found on the FSB’s website. See Peer Reviews, FIN. STABILITY BD. (last visited Oct. 27, 2012), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/tid_141/index.htm. 
 3. A rather extensive discussion may be found in EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS—THE LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS 213–60 (2012); see also 
Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalization of Law—The “Complex” Case of Bank Regulation, in THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAKING, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION 3, 
3–37 (Mary E. Hiscock & William Van Caenegem eds., 2010); Chris Brummer, How International 
Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011); David Zaring, International 
Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 
33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998). 
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risk originating in the shadow-banking sector;4 (2) effective supervision 
of big cross-border institutions, so-called globally significant financial 
institutions (GSIFIs); (3) effective understanding and management of 
risk in the financial sector, especially risk attached to financial innova-
tion, and standard production; and (4) effective resolution of cross-border 
financial institutions (CBFIs) and, more importantly, of cross-border fi-
nancial groups. 
In this Article, I will sketch a tighter, more hierarchical and more 
encompassing model of governance for global financial markets. The 
most important value of the proposed governance system is its ability to 
support and further recent reforms protecting the ideal, and enhancing 
the legitimacy, of open global markets. The proposed global governance 
structure would have four pillars supported by a similar number of global 
administrative agencies. Accordingly, this structure is envisaged to com-
prise first, a global macro-prudential supervisor; second, a global micro-
prudential supervisor; third, a global financial policy, regulation, and 
knowledge supervisor; and, fourth, a global resolution authority. The 
suggested governance system presupposes the negotiation and signing of 
an (umbrella) international treaty governing the most important aspects 
of international finance. 
To many this might sound like an unrealistic academic exercise re-
quiring reform and expenditure on the grandest scale. Several valuable 
and insightful proposals for global financial governance reform have 
been criticized or blocked on this basis or on grounds of lack of strong 
political will for reform. Clearly, no amount of academic writing can 
change the opposition of big stakeholders like the United States or the 
European Union to a supranational governance system for global finance. 
Perhaps, only an imminent financial catastrophe of a scale comparable 
with the GFC or bigger may be a threat big enough to set political minds 
                                                            
 4. Shadow banking is a generic term used to describe a number of financial activities whose 
common characteristic is that they are not supported by a Central Bank’s liquidity operations. In my 
view, shadow banking normally comprises four forms of financial activity: (1) secured financing by 
means of repos and rehypothecation; (2) money-market funds; (3) investment vehicles used to facili-
tate securitization and resecuritization transactions; and (4) hedge funds and other unregulated finan-
cial vehicles. However, there is no universally accepted definition. The FSB has offered the first 
authoritative and formal definition of shadow banking, describing it as “a system of credit interme-
diation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system, and raises i) systemic 
risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and flawed credit risk 
transfer, and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns.” FIN. STABILITY BD., SHADOW BANKING: SCOPING 
THE ISSUES—A BACKGROUND NOTE OF THE FIN. STABILITY BD. 3 (2011) [hereinafter FSB, 
SHADOW BANKING], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_110412a.pdf; see also ZOLTAN POZSAR, ET AL., SHADOW BANKING, FED. RESERVE BD. OF N.Y., 
STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/ 
sr458_July_2010_version.pdf. 
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to the task. On the other hand, academic writing and policy debates 
should have much to say regarding the optimal form of a governance 
architecture (structure) for global finance.5 
The remainder of this Article is divided into six Parts. The next Part 
describes the evolution of governance structures for global finance 
throughout the post-war period and includes a discussion of the architec-
ture that has emerged in the post-crisis period. Part III discusses the per-
ceived shortcomings of soft-law structures. Part IV identifies contempo-
rary reforms in the regulation of international finance in a number of key 
jurisdictions, such as the European Union and the United States, and at 
the international level and provides a critique of such reforms. Part V 
sets out the rationale for a “big bang” in the institutional infrastructure 
governing global finance and outlines the contours of a new governance 
model that would further undermine the project of economic globaliza-
tion. Part VI concludes. 
II. A GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN FLUX 
This Part will describe the three phases of the evolution of the glob-
al financial governance system from the Bretton Woods Era (post-1944) 
to the present times of great turbulence for global finance. It will link 
each phase of global financial governance development to corresponding 
market events and requisite financial crises. It will also provide a critical 
evaluation of the merits and flaws of governance developments in each 
of the three periods. 
A. The Three Periods 
During the first globalization phase, roughly the period between 
1870 to World War I, there was no international financial regulation and 
very little domestic regulation. So the history of modern international 
financial governance essentially starts with the Bretton Woods confer-
ence in 1944,6 establishing the IMF and the World Bank, and may be 
divided into three phases: (1) the Bretton Woods Phase (1947–1997), 
which also includes the post-Bretton Woods period (from 1972 onward) 
when the world moved toward floating exchange rates as the fixed sys-
tem became unsustainable; (2) the post-Asian Crisis period (1998–2008), 
which saw the evolution of loose global financial governance structures 
into a tighter regulatory framework, called New International Financial 
Architecture (NIFA); and (3) the post-2008 period, when national and 
                                                            
 5. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at 429–55. 
 6. The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, commonly known as the Bretton 
Woods conference, took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1–22, 1944. 
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international policies responding to the causes and consequences of the 
global financial crisis monopolize the international regulatory reform 
agenda. 
B. The First Period 
The architecture adopted by the Bretton Woods Treaty was based 
on three main policy ideas or directions.7 First, it introduced formal 
structures in multilateral economic relationships through the establish-
ment of international institutions with strong powers and capacity in 
terms of management of international monetary relations and facilitation 
of post-World War II reconstruction (and subsequent development) ef-
forts. The two key institutions were the IMF and the World Bank. Se-
cond, the Bretton Woods architecture was based on restrictions of capital 
flows, a policy that relied on closed financial markets, which retained a 
largely domestic focus—at least, until the development of the offshore 
Eurodollar market in the mid-1960s. Third, it intended to liberalize trade 
and investment flows in the global economic system. 
These principles have had a paramount influence on the develop-
ment of the Western world. The web of postwar economic interactions or 
relationships among closed national systems was based on and managed 
through two interlinked international organizations: the IMF and the 
World Bank.8 The third international body that was part of the originally 
intended framework, the International Trade Organization (ITO), as-
signed with responsibility to foster liberalization of trade and investment 
flows, never came to life. 
There were no governance arrangements for global finance—a pol-
icy choice explained by the fact that the system restricted international 
capital flows, which were regarded as destabilizing, unlike free trade 
flows. Restrictions on capital flows and hostility towards open markets 
reinforced the role of the institutions standing at the center of exchange 
stability and development finance arrangements.9 From the early 1960s, 
however, international finance made a comeback to prominence mostly 
                                                            
 7. The literature on the Bretton Woods agreement, discussions preceding the conference, and 
its impact on the development of global finance in the post-World War II years is vast. Two very 
useful works are JACQUELINE BEST, THE LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY AND THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2005) and BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (2d ed. 2008). For a concise overview, see Richard N. 
Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and 
Failure, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31 (2008). 
 8. See ROSA LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY 370–
447 (2006). 
 9. See Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Redesigning the Architecture of the Global Fi-
nancial System, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 185, 189 (2010). 
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due to regulatory restrictions in the United States that fostered offshore 
capital flows and the establishment of the so-called Eurobonds market. 
The pace of change accelerated during the 1970s when most large com-
mercial banks in the United States and other developed countries estab-
lished considerable cross-border business lines and an active presence 
abroad. 
The increasing internationalization of big commercial bank busi-
ness meant that several (informal) economic cooperation networks or 
groups, with membership comprising a small number of developed coun-
tries, emerged in the 1960s and extended their remit to banking issues. 
The most known of them is the G-7. Yet the origins of today’s complex 
web of TRNs sitting at the center of global financial governance are 
traced to another informal body, which “opened for business” in 1974 
and gradually dominated the international regulatory agenda.10 It was, of 
course, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).11 The 
Committee was accountable to the relevant heads of the member central 
banks and bank supervisors. Its core membership came from an “intri-
guing” network of central bankers convening their meetings in Basel un-
der the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and it 
was called the Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Prac-
tices. 
The first two tasks that occupied the agenda of the BCBS were the 
cross-border supervision of banks and capital adequacy, mainly focusing 
on the international banks based in the countries comprising the member-
ship of the BCBS.12 Regarding the allocation of supervisory responsibil-
ity for international banks, namely, which supervisory authority in the 
home or host country was responsible for supervising bank branches and 
subsidiaries across borders, the BCBS, in its initial form, issued the Basel 
Concordat of 1975, which was a first attempt to allocate international 
bank supervisory authority among the host and home regulators and su-
                                                            
 10. The historical events that led to its formation make for interesting reading. The establish-
ment of the Committee, an initiative of the G-10 central bank governors, came in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the American Franklin National Bank, the Israeli-British Bank in London, and the 
Bankhaus Herstatt. The latter was a small German bank that stopped operations in the middle of the 
trading day, causing a major disruption in currency markets and cross-border payments. Although 
these were non-systemic bankruptcies of three medium size banks, the G-10 central bank governors 
became concerned with increased risks to banks due to floating exchange rates and the lack of any 
coordinated cross-border supervision framework. 
 11. For the early history of BCBS, see generally CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS, 1974–1997 (2011). 
 12. See id.; see also DUNCAN R. WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL 
COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION (2005); Michael P. Malloy, Emerg-
ing International Regime of Financial Services Regulation, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 329 (2005). 
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pervisors.13 The Concordat has since undergone numerous refinements 
and amendments. A number of Western bank failures, chiefly the col-
lapse of Banco Ambrosiano in 1982 and the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI) debacle in 1991,14 exposed the framework as 
inadequate.15 Thus, the Concordat was further refined in 1983 and was 
effectively replaced in 1992 with a set of minimum standards on the su-
pervision of international banking groups.16 These were followed by the 
publication in 1997 of the Core Principles on Banking Supervision (the 
Principles) developed by the Committee in cooperation with the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).17 
Although overly optimistic in some cases, the Principles also provided 
the foundations for building sound banking supervision structures in both 
the developed and, more crucially, the developing world, and were 
placed at the heart of the NIFA framework, discussed below. 
Another very important set of regulatory standards produced by the 
BCBS during the 1980s was a risk-based “Capital Adequacy Accord” 
published in 1988, normally called Basel I.18 The main focus of Basel I 
was on credit (counterparty) risk and much less on other important risks 
such as currency risk, interest-rate risk, and market risk. In this respect, 
the framework required a minimum ratio of certain specified constituents 
                                                            
 13. See GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE (2001) (discussing the supervision of banking conglomerates and the issue of 
lead regulator); Richard J. Herring, Conflicts Between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervi-
sors, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATION 
201–20 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007). 
 14. BCCI operated in seventy-eight countries, had over 400 branches, and had assets in excess 
of $20 billion, making it the seventh largest private bank in the world by assets. BCCI became the 
subject matter of a notorious regulatory battle when it went into liquidation in 1991 following the 
eruption of a series of major money laundering scandals to which the bank was heavily involved. 
More information can be found at Bank of Credit and Commerce International, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_Credit_and_Commerce_International (last visited Oct. 27, 
2012). 
 15. See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory 
Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 241 (1992); Susan 
Emmenegger, The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision—A Secretive Club of Giants?, in THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS—PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM 224–36 
(Rainer Grote & Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006). 
 16. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENT (1992), availa-
ble at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf. 
 17. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING 
SUPERVISION AND RELATED METHODOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs129.pdf (originally published in Sept. 1997). 
 18. Joseph J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy 
and the July 1988 Report on “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards,” 23 INT’L LAW. 245, 259 (1989). 
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of capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA).19 The prescribed regulatory 
capital constituents comprised Tier 1 (core) capital, which mainly con-
sisted of shareholders equity, disclosed reserves and retained post-tax 
profit, and Tier 2 (supplementary) capital, which mainly consisted of 
subordinated debt.20 The Basel I framework endorsed a risk-weighted 
approach to the assets denominator of the capital assets ratio.21 It estab-
lished a relatively simple methodology for bank assets’ risk-weighting 
with only five risk weights—0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100% of asset 
value—assigned to all types of assets and all types of counterparties, 
judged by the origin of the counterparty (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development members versus nonmember countries) and 
its organizational, legal, or economic nature (sovereigns, credit institu-
tions, corporations), without any separate assessment of its credit-
worthiness.22 For instance, the risk-weighted ratio for all corporate bor-
rowers was 100%.23 In addition, following further consultation, the 
BCBS adopted a target standard capital-to-assets ratio of 8%, of which 
core capital constituted at least 4%.24 
Due to the institutional gravitas of participating public organiza-
tions, the importance of the countries they represented and the need to 
level the playing field in the fast growing global market for financial ser-
vices,25 the nonbinding Basel I Accord was adopted by most countries, 
first in the developed and then in the developing world, regardless of 
whether they participated in the workings of the BCBS. However, it soon 
became apparent that the rather rudimentary risk-weight methods of the 
Basel I Accord, which—ironically, considering the complexity of the 
Basel II and Basel III frameworks—was thought to be a complex ap-
proach that suffered from a number of technical weaknesses. 
The continuous internationalization of finance made apparent the 
need for the establishment of similar informal committees and regulatory 
fora in other areas of financial activity. For example, a substantial in-
crease in the number of companies that wanted to obtain a listing outside 
their domestic markets led to formulation of international standards for 
securities markets, and accounting conventions were given clear prece-
                                                            
 19. Id. at 259–62. 
 20. Id. at 260–61. 
 21. Id. at 260. 
 22. Id. at 260–61. 
 23. Id. at 261. 
 24. Id. The Basel I Accord and its amendments may be found at Basel Committee—Basel I, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_21/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 
2013). 
 25. Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 501–05 (2008). 
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dence. Regulatory initiatives emanating from those committees or fora 
attempted to address the challenges of an increasingly integrated global 
marketplace fostering the convergence of national regulatory systems. 
Accordingly, it may be said that the international financial governance 
structure (architecture) from the middle of the 1980s until 1998 was a 
loose combination of state-to-state contact groups that comprised the G 
groupings, formal international organizations such as the IMF and the 
BIS, and TRNs such as the BCBS and IOSCO.26 
In the following sections, I shall provide a concise overview of the 
developments taking place in the last two, and most important, phases. 
C. Intermediate Phase: A ‘New International Financial Architecture’ 
(1998–2008) 
1. NIFA Overview and Rationales 
During the 1990s, as finance became increasingly global, so did the 
ensuing financial crises. None of the governance structures of the post-
Bretton Woods period, which were no more than an incremental evolu-
tion of the Bretton Woods framework, were adequate to sustain the pres-
sure emanating from the developing wave of financial innovation, liber-
alization, and market integration that characterized the emergence of fi-
nancial globalization in the 1990s. In addition, the pre-1998 governance 
structures were very light and could not provide any kind of forward-
looking regulatory direction beyond market liberalization. Even in advo-
cating the latter, they were just following market developments as well as 
Washington Consensus policies fervently embraced by the Bretton 
Woods twins (the IMF and the World Bank) and the U.S. Treasury. 
Those policies, with their focus on liberalization, opening up markets, 
and, more importantly, abolition of capital restrictions—without paying 
any attention to the level of domestic market development or the compe-
tence and expertise of regulatory institutions—meant that the Asian Cri-
sis was an accident waiting to happen. And eventually, it happened in the 
summer and autumn of 1997 and shook global market confidence for 
some time.27 
The Asian Crisis made pressing the need for new governance struc-
tures for global finance, especially those related to the establishment of 
early warning systems and regulatory cooperation in the field of crisis 
                                                            
 26. See Joseph J. Norton, NIFA-II or ‘Bretton Woods-II’?: The G-20 (Leaders) Summit Pro-
cess on Managing Global Financial Markets and the World Economy – Quo Vadis?, 11 J. BANKING 
REG. 261, 266–67 (2010). 
 27. For an overview of the Asian Crisis, see AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at 72–74. 
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prevention and crisis management.28 Accordingly, partly to restore confi-
dence and partly to redress some of the weaknesses of the first phase 
with its lack of any serious market monitoring, discussions centered on 
establishing a New International Financial Architecture. The governance, 
monitoring, or regulatory areas that required strengthening were suc-
cinctly summarized by Michael Camdessus, then-head of the IMF, and 
are paraphrased here: (1) the surveillance of national economic policies, 
which should be facilitated by fuller disclosure of all relevant economic 
and financial data; (2) regional surveillance in order to encourage coun-
tries in the same region to discipline each other in order to prevent con-
tagion; (3) prudential regulation and supervision in order to lead to (resil-
ient) financial sector reform; (4) more effective structures for debt 
workouts, both at the national level and international level; (5) capital 
account liberalization to increase the orderliness of and access to interna-
tional capital markets; (6) world-wide promotion of good governance 
and reduction of corruption; and (7) strengthening IFIs, both in terms of 
resources, authority, and legitimacy, by broadening representation.29 
In the end, much less happened, and resulting governance structures 
proved markedly weak and ineffective to forecast, prevent, or manage 
the GFC that erupted almost a decade later. Yet most regulatory initia-
tives (with the exception of the radical revision of the Basel I Accord, 
normally called Basel II)30 were in the right direction. It was rather the 
absence of compulsory monitoring mechanisms and lack of supervisory 
capacity and of a binding framework for the management of cross-border 
crises that largely diminished the importance of good work that had been 
undertaken in the context of NIFA. 
The system adopted was mostly concerned with organizing the dis-
parate soft-law networks into a tighter, new structure, facilitated by the 
establishment of a new informal body, the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF). Thus, while NIFA arrangements led to the reinforcement of the 
role of the IMF and of already existing standard-setting bodies, such as 
the BCBS and IOSCO, the only truly new body to emerge from it was 
the FSF. 
                                                            
 28. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: 
A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 13 (1999). In a sense, the foundation stone of the new architec-
ture had been placed before the Asian Crisis when the G-7/8 had gradually wrested the role of cen-
tral policy coordinator. 
 29. See Michel Camdessus, Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF: 
Past, Present, and Future, Prepared Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Commit-
tee (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021398.htm; Michel 
Camdessus, Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, Reflections on the Crisis in Asia, Prepared 
Address to the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 24 (Feb. 7, 1998), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/020798.htm. 
 30. See discussion infra Part II.C.6. 
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In general, the NIFA system had four levels, incorporating both ex-
isting and new international institutions and organizations: (1) intergov-
ernmental (state-to-state contact) groups, mainly combinations of G-7/G-
8-10;31 (2) international standard-setting bodies, largely of a technocratic 
nature; (3) implementation of standards—in principle, a domestic pro-
cess, but in practice developing countries received technical assistance 
through a variety of international, regional, and bilateral sources, which 
also in some cases lobbied for or coerced implementation (for example, 
through the IMF conditionality); and (4) monitoring implementation of 
standards, through the FSAP. 
Arguably, the fourth level of NIFA was the biggest advancement 
over preexisting arrangements. For the first time, IFSs were to be sup-
ported by a rudimentary level of monitoring at the international level, 
primarily through the FSAP/ROSC process, moving standards, and 
standard-setting organizations from a purely agreement-based system to 
one with a limited level of international review.32 Namely, the soft-law 
system acquired harder edges. 
On the basis of the above analysis, we see that standard-setting un-
der NIFA presented six general characteristics: (1) the emergence of an 
international consensus on the key elements of a sound financial and 
regulatory system, at least within the G-10 countries; (2) the formulation 
of principles and practices by international groupings of technocratic au-
thorities with relevant expertise and experience, such as the BCBS, 
IOSCO, IASB, and IAIS, where the influence of industry is of critical 
value; (3) market discipline, which for the first time becomes an explicit 
pillar of supervisory practice, probably as a result and natural extension 
of Washington Consensus policies; (4) liberalization of access to national 
markets used as an incentive for the adoption of sound supervisory sys-
tems, better corporate governance, and other key elements of a robust 
financial system; (5) promotion of supervisory independence; and (6) 
absence of any formal supranational supervisory or regulatory body with 
standing in international law—meaning that, as a result, the ultimate re-
                                                            
 31. For an overview of the development of the ‘G’ groups and their impact on the evolution of 
international financial regulation, see Baxter, supra note 3. 
 32. See Douglas Arner, The Developing Discipline of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 247 n.4 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008), available at http://interlaw.ecupl.edu.cn/ 
uploadfiles/books/International%20Economic%20law.pdf (citing Mario Giovanoli, A New Architec-
ture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International Financial Standard Setting, in 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3–60 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 
2000); Joseph J. Norton, Qualified Self-regulation in the New Financial Architecture, 2 J. INT’L 
BANKING REG. 9 (2000); Rolf H. Weber, Challenges for the New Financial Architecture, 31 H.K. 
L.J. 241 (2001)). 
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sponsibility for policy implementation and supervision rested with na-
tional authorities. 
Probably the most definitive characteristic of NIFA was the in-
creasing influence that private organizations, especially big banks, 
through their industry organizations, gradually gained over international 
standard-setting during this period. Norton has suggested that as such, 
NIFA might be viewed as “an evolving policy construct in progress, 
moving towards a new ‘governance structure’ and reflecting a ‘public–
private partnership’ among governments, financial sector authorities, 
international financial institutions and private international financial in-
stitutions in the search for grounding a stable, but viable global financial 
environment.” 33 
2. The Evolution of Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Standards 
During NIFA 
At the 1997 Denver Summit, the G-7 Heads of State and Finance 
Ministers placed financial stability at center stage, issuing a Final Report 
on Financial Stability.34 Greater cooperation among supervisors and 
among the IFIs was strongly encouraged. The Denver Summit advocated 
the widespread adoption of the BCBS’s 1997 Core Principles (revised in 
2006) on bank supervision. The G-7 Finance Minister Reports in Co-
logne (June 1999) and Okinawa (June 2000) specifically followed up, in 
some detail, and outlined the central components of NIFA targeting fi-
nancial stability35: (1) stronger macroeconomic policies for emerging 
economies; (2) IFI (in particular the IMF) reform and strengthening of 
the operating framework; (3) accurate and timely informational flows 
and transparency; (4) strong financial regulation in industrial countries; 
(5) strong financial systems in emerging markets; (6) exchange rate poli-
cies; (7) sound accounting standards; (8) reform of legal infrastructure; 
(9) strengthening of corporate governance; (10) anticorruption and mon-
ey laundering; (11) technological innovation and adaptation; and (12) 
risk management. 
Although many of the above ingredients of an economic, regulato-
ry, and supervisory framework fostering financial stability are rather 
                                                            
 33. Norton, supra note 26, at 272. 
 34. See G7 SUMMIT 1997, DENVER, COLORADO, FINAL REPORT TO THE G7 HEADS OF STATE 
AND GOVERNMENT ON PROMOTING FINANCIAL STABILITY (1997), available at http://www.g7. 
utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/finanrpt.htm. 
 35. See G8 SUMMIT 1999, COLOGNE, GERMANY, REPORT OF THE G7 FINANCE MINISTERS TO 
THE KÖLN ECONOMIC SUMMIT (1999), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/ 
fm061999.htm; G8 SUMMIT 2000, FUKUOKA, JAPAN, REPORT OF THE G-7 FINANCE MINISTERS TO 
THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT (2000), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/ 
fm20000708-st.html. 
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mainstream, the list above also had surprising inclusions, such as corpo-
rate governance. 
The main vehicle for the implementation of these initiatives would 
be a set of “global principles and standards” touching on the following 
areas: banking regulation; capital markets regulation; insurance supervi-
sion; corporate governance; financial conglomerates; payment, settle-
ment, and custody mechanisms; pension funds and collective investment 
schemes; and accounting and auditing standards. Other areas that were 
addressed by G-7 Finance Ministers, with mixed results, were such mat-
ters as: exchange rate stability; short-term capital flows; regional re-
sponses to financial crises; reform of the IFIs; offshore centers; and high-
ly leveraged institutions, such as hedge funds. Other relevant matters that 
were not tackled with any degree of consistency were: the “prudential 
regulation carve out,” namely the interaction of international prudential 
standards and the trade liberalization process for financial services; and, 
even more critically, as it was shown during the GFC, the consolidated 
supervision of global banks, banking and financial organizations, and 
financial conglomerates.36 
3. The Role of the G-20 During NIFA 
The G-20 was created as a response both to the financial crises of 
the late 1990s and as a response to the growing recognition that key 
emerging market countries were not adequately included in the core of 
global economic policymaking and governance.37 Thus, in September 
1999, the G-7 Finance Ministers formally announced the establishment 
of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers as the successor to the G-
22/G-33. The G-20 (Finance Ministers) was conceived as a complement 
to the G-7 (Finance Ministers), not as a replacement. The group’s man-
date was to be (yet another) informal forum that promoted open and con-
structive discussion between industrial and emerging market countries on 
key issues related to global economic stability. By contributing to the 
strengthening of the international financial architecture and providing 
opportunities for dialogue on national policies, international cooperation, 
and international financial institutions, the G-20 helps to support growth 
and development across the globe. The primary, but not sole function, of 
                                                            
 36. See JOHN J. KIRTON & ANTARA HALDAR, G7/8 SUMMIT REMIT MANDATES, 1975–2003 
(2003), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_remits.html. For an 
overview of the G-7 evolving role during the same period, see Peter I. Hajnal & John J. Kirton, The 
Evolving Role and Agenda of the G7/G8: A North American Perspective, 7 NAT’L INST. FOR RES. 
ADVANCEMENT REV. 5, 6–8 (2000), available at www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/hajnal_nira.pdf. 
 37. A detailed description of the G-20 mandate is available at What Is the G20?, G20.ORG, 
http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/g20 (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
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the G-20 (Finance Ministers) was to consider global and emerging mar-
ket financial matters and assist in overseeing the international financial 
system in the post-Asian Crisis period and to encourage the implementa-
tion of NIFA standards and structures. 
Members would be considered equal—there would be no formal 
voting. Group positions would be made by consensus. The view of close 
observers of the group is that the G-20 (Finance Ministers) did provide 
meaningful leadership and input from 1999 through to 2004 in the con-
text of NIFA implementation and monitoring. Financial stability became 
an issue of lesser importance after 2004, when the underlying issues were 
thought to have been properly addressed, and broader financial and eco-
nomic issues came to dominate the group’s agenda, especially the issue 
of better integration of emerging economies into the globalization pro-
cess and the world financial system. 
From 2005 onward, the G-20 (Finance Ministers) started to focus 
on balanced and orderly world economic development that included con-
sideration of the volatility in the price of oil and other commodities; 
completion of the WTO Doha round of negotiations; a sustainable 
growth agenda; the internal governance reform of the IMF and World 
Bank (for example, quota arrangements, representation and or legitima-
cy, effectiveness, and accountability issues); review of the IMF’s role 
and facilities respecting emerging economies; energy security; and the 
nature of development aid programs.38 As a result of the GFC, the G-20 
has become the supreme coordination and policymaking body in the field 
of global financial reform. The G-20’s new role in the emerging global 
financial architecture is discussed below in section D1. 
4. The Evolution of the IMF’s Role 
Since the early 1970s, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s with 
the emergence of an array of sovereign debt crises, including the 1994–
1995 Mexican Crisis and the Asian Crisis, it became apparent that mi-
croeconomic, institutional, and structural issues had considerable impact 
on a country’s abilities to implement sound macroeconomic and ex-
change policies. During the same period, the IMF was in search of a new 
mission. In the process, the IMF became the main IFI dealing with global 
financial stability and crisis prevention also adding standard production 
to its remit. This shift also meant that the IMF’s role as a policymaker 
and policy-giver came under intense criticism. For instance, the Wash-
ington Consensus-based liberalization recipe that it gave to most coun-
tries in distress during the Asian Crisis was widely regarded to be coun-
                                                            
 38. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at 190–93. 
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terproductive or outright harmful.39 The IMF became a particularly 
strong mechanism for the promotion of NIFA standards, because compli-
ance with requisite standards and law reform requests could be tied to its 
“conditionality.”40 In addition, through the NIFA monitoring arrange-
ments, the IMF became a central player in measuring the effectiveness of 
IFSs in the NIFA period. 
The FSAP and ROSC initiative (jointly conducted by the IMF and 
the World Bank) was intended to promote long-term financial sector re-
form. The IMF could assess financial sector robustness through: bilateral 
country consultations and surveillance41 and a range of “financial sound-
ness indicators”42 (as part of FSAP program); and multilateral surveil-
lance involving ongoing analysis of global and regional trends,43 multi-
lateral consultations on global imbalances, various Early Warning Sys-
tem (EWS) models, and data quality and dissemination channels. For the 
reasons explained below, these tools proved highly ineffective to forecast 
and prevent the GFC. 
5. Financial Stability Forum: International Oversight and Coordination 
The FSF was established under the auspices of the G-7 in February 
1999 with a mandate to promote international financial stability, improve 
the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk through enhanced 
information exchange and international cooperation in financial market 
supervision and surveillance.44 The FSF included five different types of 
members: national authorities, international financial institutions, other 
international organizations, international financial organizations, and 
                                                            
 39. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ARNER & ROSS BUCKLEY, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE 55–72 (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003). 
 40. See Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, The IMF and 
the Financial Sector, Prepared Remarks at Seminar on Financial Risks, System Stability, and Eco-
nomic Globalization (June 5, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
2000/060500.htm. 
 41. See Bilateral Surveillance Over Members’ Policies Executive Board Decision, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (June 15, 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769. 
htm#decision. 
 42. See Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) and the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Nov. 30, 
2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/fsi.htm. 
 43. Two of the main outputs are the IMF’s annual World Economic Outlook and the semi-
annual Global Financial Stability Report. The IMF used to see “multilateral surveillance” as being 
the most important of its functions and described it as: “[T]he surveillance of economic linkages and 
policy spillovers between countries as well as international economic and market developments.” 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMF’S MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE 7 (2006), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2006/ms/eng/pdf/chap1.pdf. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the IMF, see id. at 7–13. 
 44. See George A. Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability Fo-
rum, in ESSAYS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW AND ECONOMICS NO. 24 (1999). 
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committees of central bank experts. The FSF created a number of ad hoc 
working groups to develop recommendations on specific issues, includ-
ing highly leveraged institutions, capital flows, offshore financial cen-
ters, and implementation of standards, incentives to foster implementa-
tion of standards, deposit insurance and e-finance. Arguably, the most 
important part of the FSF’s original mandate was the strengthening of 
surveillance and supervision of the international financial system. Specif-
ically, the FSF was called to assess vulnerabilities affecting the interna-
tional financial system; identify and oversee the action needed to address 
these vulnerabilities; and improve coordination and information ex-
change among the various authorities responsible for financial stability. 
Eventually, the FSF constituents agreed upon twelve key areas of 
standards, grouped into three main categories and known as the Com-
pendium. Each set of key standards was supported by a methodology for 
assessment and implementation and a variety of related principles, prac-
tices, and guidelines. The FSB has updated the Compendium to add to 
the list of key standards.45 Selection of areas and designation of key 
                                                            
 45. The key standards represent minimum requirements for good practice and often refer to 
more than one aspect of the financial system. They also vary in terms of level of international en-
dorsement. A broad categorization of the endorsed standards may be grouped as follows: 
 Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency 
(1) Monetary and financial policy transparency: “Code of Good Practices on Transparen-
cy in Monetary and Financial Policies,” issued by the IMF. 
(2) Fiscal policy transparency: “Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency,” issued 
by the IMF. 
(3) Data dissemination: “Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemina-
tion System,” issued by the IMF. 
Institutional and Market Infrastructure 
(4) Insolvency: “Insolvency and Creditor Rights,” issued by the World Bank. 
(5) Corporate governance: “Principles of Governance,” issued by the OECD. 
(6) Accounting: “International Accounting Standards (IAS),” issued by the IASB. 
(7) Auditing: “International Standards on Auditing (ISA),” issued by IFAC. 
(8) Payment and settlement: “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures,” issued by 
CPSS and IOSCO. 
(9) Market integrity: “Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Fi-
nancing of Terrorism & Proliferation,” issued by FATF. 
 Financial Regulation and Supervision 
(10) Banking supervision: “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,” issued 
by BCBS. 
(11) Securities regulation: “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,” issued by 
IOSCO. 
(12) Insurance supervision: “Insurance Core Principles,” issued by IAIS. 
Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstability 
board.org/cos/key_standards.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). More recently the FSB has added the 
following standards: 
(1) IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties, which set out comprehensive 
standards for risk management of a central counterparty, to facilitate the reform of over-
the-counter derivatives markets; 
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standards was something of a bottom-up process, with standard setters 
choosing to address and promote their respective standards to the inter-
governmental groupings such as the G-7 and the international financial 
institutions for adoption and support. Nonetheless, the standard-setting 
process acquired homogeneous characteristics. 
The FSF’s legacy is not as successful as it could have been.46 Apart 
from problems with the selection of the key standards, its very nature 
was unclear, perceived by some as a “think tank with nowhere to go,”47 
probably an accurate description given its invisibility and narrow mem-
bership. The opaque nature of soft law making was also another factor 
that undermined the FSF’s legitimacy and might have also prejudiced the 
effectiveness of the selected standards and their implementation. There-
fore, it was not surprising that the G-20 (Leaders’ level) decided at its 
Washington (November 2008) and London (April 2009) Summits to re-
place the FSF with the FSB in order to strengthen coordination of stand-
ard production and implementation. Nonetheless, as explained in the next 
section, the FSB suffers many of the shortcomings that plagued the FSF. 
6. BCBS Develops a Risk-Sensitive Capital Framework 
One of the central—and least successful—parts of NIFA was the 
Basel II capital adequacy framework. In the late 1990s, the weaknesses 
of Basel I led to an extensive round of negotiations for the drafting of a 
new accord. Given the many changes in the financial services industry 
and the growing difficulties experienced by supervisors with the com-
plexity and changing nature of risk in global financial markets, the start-
ing point was to emphasize the role of market discipline in risk manage-
ment.48 
In June 1999, the BIS issued a proposal that would significantly 
change the capital adequacy Accord through extensive revision and re-
                                                                                                                                     
(2) the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems by the BCBS and IADI. 
The FSB will also add in the future ‘one or more standards on resolution regimes for fi-
nancial institutions. 
FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 9 (2011), available at http://www.financialstability 
board.org/publications/r_110415a.pdf. 
 46. Cally Jordan, The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and the Legacy 
of the Financial Stability Forum 3–4 (Melbourne Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 501, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662609. 
 47. John Eatwell, The Challenges Facing International Financial Regulation, FIN. POL’Y 
FORUM, July 2001, at 14, available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCEatwell.pdf. 
 48. As Daniel Tarullo (a current U.S. Federal Reserve Governor and a professor of law) has 
observed, Basel II consultation resembled trade negotiations and, at the outset, no national regulator 
had a clear idea what outcome they desired. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE 
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 87 (2008). 
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finement of Basel I and by providing an alternative approach to measur-
ing risk that would bring the capital framework closer to global market 
risk management practices.49 Following several rounds of consultation, 
the revised Accord was finally published in June 200450 and further addi-
tions were released in 2005.51 The Basel II framework for the assessment 
of the capital adequacy of international credit institutions and monitoring 
of their compliance was based on three pillars: Pillar 1 provided “mini-
mum capital requirements”; Pillar 2 described the process for the “super-
visory review” of capital adequacy; and Pillar 3 provided the mecha-
nisms to facilitate and enforce “market discipline” through public disclo-
sure.52 
Pillar 1 involved significant changes in capital adequacy regulation. 
More specifically, although Pillar 1 reproduced the basic provisions of 
Basel I, it also introduced important changes in how aspects of credit risk 
were to be calculated and it expanded the range of risks addressed by 
capital adequacy standards to include operational risk.53 Three different 
options were available to banks to measure the regulatory capital that 
they had to assign to each asset.54 The first option was the “standardized 
approach,”55 intended to be used by less sophisticated institutions. Alt-
hough it was based on Basel I, this approach used enhanced risk sensitiv-
ity measures, as it differentiated among exposures to different classes of 
bank clients.56 Risk weightings for sovereign and corporate exposures 
could be calculated according to external credit assessments provided by 
rating agencies or public organizations such as the OECD.57 The second 
and third options were based on the new “Internal Ratings Based Ap-
proach” (IRB).58 Under the IRB, international banks were required to 
establish their own internal methods for assessing the relative risks of 
their assets in determining the capital requirement for given exposures.59 
In this mode, the “foundation” version of the IRB for risk management 
                                                            
 49. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK 
(1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.pdf. 
 50. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, G-10 Central Bank Governors and Heads of 
Supervision Endorse the Publication of the Revised Capital Framework (June 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p040626.htm. 
 51. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [hereinafter BASEL II ACCORD]. 
 52. Id. at 2–3. 
 53. Id. at 12. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 19–20. 
 57. Id. at 20. 
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59. Id. at 52. 
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made limited use of internal Value at Risk (VaR) models.60 The ad-
vanced IRB made much wider use of VaR and was meant for the largest 
and most sophisticated financial institutions.61 
Following the eruption of the GFC, the Basel framework was sub-
jected to severe criticism.62 First, the GFC proved that Basel II relied ex-
cessively on risk-modeling and credit ratings that fostered not only regu-
latory arbitrage (similar to Basel I) but also a relentless push toward ev-
er-reduced equity capital cushions, the only form of regulatory capital 
that matters in the event of a crisis.63 Second, the sophistication of finan-
cial institutions meant that the supervisor had to ultimately rely on the 
superior risk-modeling expertise of the institution or of the CRAs, mak-
ing “supervisory review” ineffective.64 Third, market discipline proved to 
be much less effective than the previously assumed monitoring mecha-
nism for several reasons.65 Market participants have limited ability to 
monitor a bank’s exposures in light of the very complex instruments fi-
nancial institutions trade with each other and the ability to hide expo-
sures through shadow-banking vehicles.66 Complexity, opacity, and in-
terconnectedness just strengthened the “too-big-to-fail” problem—
weakening, if not obliterating, shareholders’ and creditors’ incentives to 
properly monitor the market behavior and business policies and practices 
of the banks concerned.67 Fourth, by focusing on individual banking in-
stitutions (the micro-prudential perspective), it largely ignored the impact 
of trading and market behavior of such institutions on the financial sys-
tem as a whole and its stability (the macro-prudential perspective).68 
Fifth, it provided no framework for the creation of liquidity cushions 
within highly geared financial institutions.69 As has already been ex-
plained, this was one of the main causes of the GFC. Finally, the frame-
work was procyclical, allowing increased credit flows to the economy 
during the period of growth, feeding asset bubbles, while banks found 
themselves inadequately capitalized when the various asset bubbles burst 
and national economies entered into recession.70 
                                                            
 60. Id. at 80. 
 61. Id. at 84–85. 
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342 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:321 
7. Implementation—Monitoring and the FSAP Surveys 
An important element of the standard-setting process involves mon-
itoring the implementation of international standards. While primarily a 
domestic process, implementation is supported by a range of assistance 
mechanisms. Monitoring mainly takes place at the international level 
through the international financial institutions, especially the IMF and 
World Bank. Specifically, the IMF works through its annual Article IV 
consultations.71 
FSAP itself consists of three main components: (1) systematic 
analysis of financial soundness indicators (FSIs) and stress tests; (2) as-
sessments of standards and codes; and (3) assessment of the broader fi-
nancial stability framework, including systemic liquidity arrangements, 
governance and transparency and financial safety nets and insolvency 
regimes.72 Upon completion of FSAP surveys, the joint IMF and World 
Bank team prepares a confidential memorandum presenting their find-
ings. The IMF uses those documents to prepare a Financial Sector Stabil-
ity Assessment (FSSA), which is presented to the Executive Board each 
year. It is also often used in connection with the Fund’s surveillance role 
under its biennial Article IV consultations. FSAP surveys are also used to 
facilitate the IMF’s role in the production of financial standards and 
codes of practice as well as the World Bank’s development activities, 
enabling it to provide higher quality and more targeted technical assis-
tance. The production of FSAP surveys is a separate activity from the 
IMF’s role in compiling ROSCs, yet the latter is strongly based on FSAP 
findings. In recent years, the IMF and the World Bank have attempted to 
integrate the FSAP and ROSC processes into their evolving development 
agenda. 
FSAP surveys eventually became the subject of strong criticism due 
to their failure to give any warning signs before the eruption of the GFC. 
Their practice in the pre-GFC era had, in general, shown several weak-
nesses. 
Arguably, FSAP’s inadequacies did not always relate to weak con-
duct of the surveys but were symptomatic of the bigger global govern-
ance weaknesses of the NIFA era and beyond. First, in the absence of an 
international treaty imposing a compliance commitment or any other 
contractual (legal) obligation, akin to that which may be imposed on IMF 
or World Bank borrowers through conditionality, cooperation with FSAP 
was requested voluntarily. As late as 2006, approximately twenty to 25% 
                                                            
 71. Factsheet: The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
 72. Id. 
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of countries that were systemically important, had vulnerable financial 
systems, or both—key criteria endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank 
Boards for FSAP surveys—had not been assessed, including Turkey, 
Indonesia, China and, most importantly, the United States.73 In addition, 
the absence of a global regulatory supervisory authority to follow up 
FSAP findings and recommend policy under the threat of sanctions 
meant that timely and accurate observations as part of the FSAP, as was 
the case with Iceland, went unheeded. 
Among the FSAP’s many weaknesses was the fact that the volumi-
nous data was of variable quality and not always capable of quantitative 
processing because it was also incomplete. In addition, the questions 
asked in the context of the FSAP process were not always those that 
should have been asked in the first place. Often this was due to the fact 
that it tried to measure the implementation of monolithic standards on 
markets of varied structure and depth as are those of developing coun-
tries. Also, the carrying out of FSAP inspections suffered from major 
inconsistencies,74 and IMF and World Bank staff’s lack of familiarity 
with the national economies under scrutiny made matters even worse. 
One reason for these inconsistencies is an alleged lack of skills and ex-
pertise by the FSAP teams. Another was the fact that FSAP teams mostly 
comprised economists who were called to examine the implementation 
of financial regulations, a job that is, arguably, much better carried out 
by suitably qualified lawyers, especially when it involves compliance 
check box methods. This could have led FSAP staff to draw wrong con-
clusions on an inspected country’s regulatory robustness. In addition, 
updating FSAPs, especially in view of the constantly evolving methodol-
ogies, was problematic. For any country submitting to the highly intru-
sive and labor intensive FSAP process, which involved facilitating the 
carrying out of the surveys by large teams of financial experts, FSAP 
was a significant burden, and even more so for smaller countries with 
limited resources. 
The essentially domestic focus of the FSAP process did not capture 
cross-border linkages, influences, risk transmission channels, or insti-
tutional interconnectedness. This eliminated FSAP’s usefulness in the 
case of SIFIs that maintained very large cross-border deposit and asset 
                                                            
 73. The United States finally permitted an FSAP to be conducted in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2006/ 
fsap/eng/pdf/report.pdf. The IMF has issued a subsequent review explaining what remedial actions 
the Fund and its members have taken to strengthen FSAP. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE 
FINANCIAL SECTORS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM AFTER TEN YEARS—EXPERIENCES AND REFORMS FOR 
THE NEXT DECADE (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf. 
 74. Jordan, supra note 46, at 21. 
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bases and attendant revenue lines. Namely, the riskiness of the most im-
portant institutions in any given economy was largely under-surveyed 
and, as a result, risks went under-reported. Moreover, the standards 
themselves were in some cases problematic and backward-looking. In the 
case of IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, the standards were 
dominated by efficient market ideology and U.S. notions of tight regula-
tion of retail equity markets, ignoring the role of other markets, especial-
ly where hedge funds were very active.75 This meant that FSAP surveys 
missed areas and issues of critical interest, especially the role of unregu-
lated markets in propagating systemic risk. Since then, IOSCO has taken 
stock of these inadequacies and revised its standards. 
8. A Critique of NIFA 
Well before the eruption of the GFC, globalized markets had posed 
very serious challenges to a system that was largely based on national 
regulatory or supervisory competence, even within the European Union. 
The three main concerns were: (1) regulatory arbitrage, which was inten-
sified through the use of shadow-banking schemes; (2) intensification of 
regulatory competition, caused by the supervisor’s tendency or official 
mandate to attract business to their jurisdiction, which can trigger a race 
to the bottom; and (3) the globalized nature of market risks, especially 
those linked to market abuse, and systemic risks.76 
In addition, NIFA did not include a comprehensive financial sector 
or system reform package that would factor in relevant developmental, 
trade, and investment objectives. There was also a striking absence of 
focus on the actual fragility of developed countries’ financial systems. 
Furthermore, the NIFA structures were especially weak when it came to 
crisis warnings and cross-border crisis management.77 As a result, NIFA 
structures proved seriously inadequate to prevent the GFC. 
D. The Emerging Architecture 
While the response to the Asian financial crisis had a very strong 
international dimension (centered on the IMF), the majority of policies 
seeking to contain the severity and consequences of the GFC had a 
                                                            
 75. Press Release, Int’l Org. Sec. Comm., Global Securities Regulators Adopt New Principles 
and Increase Focus on Systemic Risk (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/ 
pdf/IOSCONEWS188.pdf. See INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM., UNREGULATED FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
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 76. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 36, 40, 50–52 (2007). 
 77. Arner & Buckley, supra note 9, at 7. 
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strong domestic or regional (in the case of the European Union) dimen-
sion. At the international level, coordination initially took place through 
the G-7 and, at the multilateral level, through the FSF and the world’s 
major central banks. However, from November 2008 onward, the G-20 
became the main body for coordination of policies intended to avert a 
global economic catastrophe and the meltdown of the international fi-
nancial system. During the initial phases, which mainly affected devel-
oped countries, the IFIs and the WTO played a marginal role. Only when 
the tremors spread beyond the G-7 countries, and especially when the 
crisis was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis, did the IMF take cen-
ter stage. On the other hand, the WTO has remained sidelined, beyond 
discussions about the completion of the Doha round, possibly a serious 
strategic mistake as trade liberalization and financial stability should, 
arguably, be realigned at the global level. 
The reform initiatives so far have been twofold: the reform of su-
pervisory structures to facilitate regulatory cooperation and crisis man-
agement; and the replacement and enhancement of international stand-
ards to radically improve the quality of international financial regulation. 
The architectural changes in the period after the onset of the GFC in the 
international context broadly comprise, first, the emergence of the G-
20;78 second, FSF’s successor the FSB, whose main mission is the coor-
dination of the standard-setting process and oversight of the standard-
setting TRNs;79 and, third, the reformed IMF.80 Each of these institutions 
has a different membership, mission, and legal status. Finally, an im-
portant role is envisaged for the joint regulatory bodies called “supervi-
sory colleges,” which are assumed to provide coordination and leader-
ship in the supervision of large systemically important cross-border fi-
nancial institutions. 
1. The Emergence of the G-20 
In terms of international financial governance, the most important 
development brought about by the GFC is the emergence of the G-20 as 
the principal coordinating body, following the formation of a government 
                                                            
 78. See Claudia Schmucker & Katharina Gnath, From the G8 to the G20: Reforming the Glob-
al Economic Governance System, (GARNET Working Paper No. 73/09, 2010), available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/7310.pdf. 
 79. Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Credit Crisis and the Financial Sta-
bility Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES 
L.J. 488, 489–90 (2009). 
 80. For an overview of the emerging architecture, see generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY & 
FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010); Giovanoli, 
supra note 1. 
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leaders’ level within this group.81 Apart from severe shortcomings of 
TRNs when it came to cross-border crisis management and coordination, 
the limited capacity and ability of IFIs made them an inadequate means 
to coordinate meaningful international crisis management efforts.82 Ar-
guably, the wide array of economic policies and regulatory reforms that 
had to be adopted to counter the effects of the GFC made the assumption 
of a leading role by the G-20 governments the only reasonable response 
in the circumstances. 
At the April 2009 London Summit, the G-20 leaders reached a 
broad agreement to enhance the representation of emerging economies to 
better reflect their growing economic influence. The G-20 now compris-
es the G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) and the biggest emerging economies: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey.83 The European Union 
is represented through the E.U. Presidency and the European Central 
Bank (ECB), bringing the membership tally to twenty. Moreover, the 
IMF Managing Director, the Chair of the IMF IMFC, the Chair of the 
IMF Development Committee, and the President of the World Bank are 
ex officio members of the G-20. Other formal international organiza-
tions, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), are involved in certain areas. However, the WTO was not 
formally included—a weakness in the framework. 
The nineteen country members of the G-20 plus the European Un-
ion represent approximately two-thirds of the world’s population, 80% of 
world trade, and 90% of the world’s GDP.84 However, the G-20’s scant 
resources and wide and fluid agenda puts in doubt the ability (and will-
ingness) of the G-20 (Leaders’ level) to play a leadership role in the field 
of financial stability on a permanent basis.85 It follows that because the 
G-20 represents only a temporary solution to the global challenge of fi-
                                                            
 81. For an analytical account, see Norton, supra note 26, at 281–89. A critical account is pro-
vided by Ngaire Woods, The G20 Leaders and Global Governance (Oxford Univ. Global Econ. 
Gov’t Program, Working Paper No. 2010/59, 2010), available at http://www.globaleconomicgov 
ernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Woods-2010-The-G20-and-Global-Governance.doc.pdf. 
 82. David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 
493–94 (2010). 
 83. Members, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/members (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010). 
 84. Statistics, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/numeralia (last visited Feb. 10, 
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nancial stability governance, “a regulatory vacuum remains to be 
filled.”86 
2. The IMF 
Under the new governance arrangements, mostly agreed to by the 
G-20 (Leaders’ level), the IMF is envisaged to play a key role in the 
global financial architecture emerging as a result of the GFC. First, the 
IMF has remained the most important global institution for macro-
financial supervision. Second, it will conduct a strengthened FSAP, as all 
G-20 members have agreed to subject themselves to FSAP surveys and 
support the transparent assessment of their national regulatory systems. It 
will also conduct early warning exercises in cooperation with the FSB. 
Of course, the IMF is not a selective club of a number of influential 
countries. It is a full-fledged international organization with solid institu-
tional foundations and universal membership, although its quota-based 
decisionmaking process still favors the United States and European 
members. It has the potential to be much more representative than any of 
the “Gs.” In addition, the G-20 did not rule out the possibility of making 
FSAP and ROSC surveys compulsory through a future revision of the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
Even if the FSAP and ROSC surveys were made compulsory for 
IMF members, the question would remain as to what the IMF should do 
with that information because it cannot be acted upon by the Fund itself, 
which lacks the powers of an international supervisor who could inter-
vene if national authorities showed complacency in the face of stark 
warnings. Clearly, transforming the IMF, which is also the global lender 
of last resort for sovereign borrowers, into the sole supervisor of global 
markets would concentrate excessive power into the hands of a global 
institution, which is already very powerful and has a rather mixed record 
when it comes to crisis management. Therefore, a different way must be 
found to build cross-border supervisory and crisis resolution capacity. I 
suggest in a subsequent section that this may be done by strengthening 
IMF’s supervisory capacity as part of a broader regulatory structure 
charged with the governance of international finance. 
3. From the FSF to the FSB 
The Washington and, more conclusively, the London Summit of the 
G-20 (Leaders’ level) led to the reconstitution of the much maligned 
                                                            
 86. Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial 
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 245 (2010); see 
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FSF, which became a global Financial Stability Board, although it lacks, 
like the FSF, any international law standing. The FSB is much more rep-
resentative than its predecessor because its membership includes repre-
sentatives of twenty-four countries. In addition, all major IFIs, such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the ECB, and all major standard-setting 
bodies, such as the BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS, are members of the FSB. 
Also, unlike the BCBS or other TRNs, FSB’s membership is subject to 
regular reviews, giving the organization a strong characteristic of open-
ness. 
The FSB has inherited the FSF’s original mandate of setting stand-
ards to assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, identifying 
and overseeing actions required to address such vulnerabilities, and pro-
moting coordination and information sharing among authorities respon-
sible for financial stability. It has also been assigned a number of key 
additional tasks: (1) monitoring and provision of advice on market de-
velopments and their implications for regulatory policy; (2) monitoring 
and provision of advice on best practices for meeting regulatory stand-
ards; (3) undertaking joint strategic reviews of the policy development 
work of the ISSBs to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, and fo-
cused on priorities and addressing gaps; (4) setting guidelines for and 
supporting the establishment of supervisory colleges; (5) supporting con-
tingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with 
respect to systemically important firms; and (6) collaborating with the 
IMF to conduct EWS exercises.87 
The division of responsibility between the IMF and the FSB did not 
prove a thorny issue. The IMF has remained the principal institution re-
sponsible for surveillance of the global financial system and monitoring 
of standards implementation through the FSAP and ROSCs. The FSB is 
taking the lead in terms of standard setting and coordination of standard-
setting bodies.88 
It has been argued by expert commentators that the FSB constitutes 
a marked improvement over FSF’s fading regulatory profile and weak 
mandate.89 However, the uncertainty surrounding the FSB in terms of 
accountability lines and status is considerable, raising the same questions 
as the operation of the BCBS. For example, while the FSB was reconsti-
tuted by the G-20, there is no clear line of reporting to this body. In addi-
tion, like the FSF, the FSB remains an informal organization, which in 
itself is neither a (self-standing) standard-setting entity nor a supervisory 
                                                            
 87. See Mandate, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/man 
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 88. AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at 208. 
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authority.90 As a result, it “has no institutional powers and can neither 
force any country (whether a member of the FSF/FSB or not) to imple-
ment the standards approved by it nor impose any sanctions.”91 In addi-
tion, its lack of a standing in international law means that the FSB does 
not have any means of formal representation. Also, a number of unre-
solved questions surround its standard-setting and coordination mission. 
For instance, it is by no means clear whether the FSB is the ultimate arbi-
ter with regard to design and adoption of IFSs, nor does its mandate ex-
tend to rendering the other ISSBs accountable to the Board.92 This lack 
of clear lines of responsibility, in terms of IFS production and implemen-
tation, could become a rather contentious issue when a controversial new 
IFS (or a set of IFSs), which is not based on broad consensus yet gener-
ates distributional conflict, is imposed on national jurisdictions.93 
It is widely expected that the FSB will provide a smoother frame-
work for standard setting and implementation, although it also adds yet 
another layer in the already over-complicated decisionmaking and stand-
ard-setting system for global finance.94 However, its lack of formal legal 
status, its inability to impose sanctions for noncompliance, and its lack of 
clear accountability lines are bound to prove problematic. Finally, the 
mandate given to the FSB is not the answer to the biggest questions of 
international regulatory coordination that have arisen in the course of the 
GFC.95 In summary, these are, first, the supervision of SIFIs with strong 
cross-border presence; second, the issue of burden sharing for resolutions 
of such institutions, which during the GFC fell disproportionately on 
home country Treasuries; and third, international crisis management co-
ordination to contain spillovers created by actions of weak national regu-
lators (as was the case with Icelandic regulators) or regulators that pursue 
a narrow national interest agenda. 
Accordingly, if G-20 governments do not want to keep fighting the 
last crisis, which is the underlying rationale for the gigantic wave of re-
cent reforms, the role of the FSB will have to change. The effortless way 
in which the FSB has been involved in peer review to test compliance 
with its standards and its close involvement with supervisory colleges 
shows that the best mission for an FSB reconstituted in the guise of an 
international law body is to become the formal micro-prudential regula-
tor of G-SIFIs. Another formal body within the regulatory structure pro-
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posed in section four below could perform the FSB’s duties in terms of 
standard setting, bringing under its umbrella of oversight the BCBS, 
IOSCO, and other regulatory TRNs of central importance for the regula-
tion of contemporary financial markets. 
4. The Supervisory Colleges 
Following the G-20 summit in Washington, which stressed the im-
portance of international regulatory coordination through the formation 
of collaborative groups of supervisors, the FSF/FSB initiated the process 
for the formation of supervisory colleges for (in the first place) thirty 
large and complex financial institutions judged to have global systemic 
significance. Supervisory colleges are multilateral working groups of 
national authorities involved in the supervision of an international bank-
ing group. They are seen as a practical mechanism to closing the gap in 
the supervision of large cross-border financial groups with multiple 
stakeholders in a variety of countries. Thus, the colleges are established 
to enhance effective, consolidated supervision of cross-border financial 
groups on an ongoing basis, including monitoring any threat that the 
group poses for the stability of the financial system of the countries in-
volved. However, the colleges do not interfere with existing bilateral or 
multilateral supervisory arrangements, nor do they act as a replacement 
to national regulators. A substantial part of their work (and a key to their 
success) is overseeing the drafting of recovery and resolution plans by 
those groups (so-called “living wills”), which are meant as the principal 
means to simplify corporate structures, to make supervision more effec-
tive, and to avoid Lehman-type predicaments in the resolution of cross-
border groups. 
The BCBS concluded its consultation on Good Practice Principles 
with respect to supervisory colleges in 2010 and published a final set of 
principles,96 which provide college objectives, structure and 
decisionmaking processes, and procedures for communication and in-
formation sharing between participating national supervisors. Although a 
significant improvement over pre-GFC arrangements for cross-border 
financial group supervision, the colleges are not international supervisors 
for the groups concerned. All enforcement powers remain vested with 
national authorities. In addition, there are a number of different colleges 
supervising the same international banking groups, creating room for 
confusion. Also the colleges do not provide, in the absence of burden-
sharing arrangements, any comfort that, in the event of a crisis, they will 
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not fall apart with each supervisor trying to guard narrowly defined na-
tional interests. 
E. Summary 
This section has charted the evolution of global governance struc-
tures from the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 to date. The relevant 
analysis has progressed from the early post-World War II years of pro-
tectionism and closed financial markets, when the Bretton Woods twins 
were shaping their mandates, to the period in the 1970s when the IMF 
especially had to reinvent its role. The sovereign debt crises of the 1980s 
and 1990s and the development needs of the post-colonial world meant 
that, on the eve of the Asian Crisis, the two institutions stood as tall as 
ever. In the meantime, their limited regulatory mandate and the degree of 
inflexibility ingrained in their statutes and operations meant that much 
more cooperative forms of international regulation had to be found to 
address the challenges posed by the growth of international finance in the 
post-Bretton Woods period. Since the 1970s, when global markets 
showed the first signs of integration, up to the 1990s and the 2000s, 
when integration acquired a frenetic pace, the regulation of international 
finance was mostly based on informal TRNs such as the BCBS and state-
to-state contact groups such as the various “G” groupings. 
The Asian Crisis meant a tightening of governance structures but in 
a way that would coopt the ever more powerful interests of the global 
(Western) finance industry. Thus, the NIFA governance paradigm had at 
its center the TRNs and their standards in the production of which the 
private sector had a critical say.97 This was coupled by a weak system of 
monitoring undertaken by the IMF and the World Bank. The NIFA struc-
tures proved unable to prevent, or even predict, the GFC, and some of 
their most important segments, such as the Basel capital standards, seem 
to have contributed both to the buildup and the severity of the GFC. This 
accentuated the case for far-reaching reforms. The United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, and the TRNs have introduced critical reforms in a num-
ber of areas from capital standards to regulation of OTC derivatives trad-
ing. They particularly try to address moral hazard emanating from the 
operation of “too-big-to-fail” institutions.98 
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However, the governance architecture that has emerged, which has 
witnessed the rise of the G-20 and the reconstitution of the FSF and FSB, 
does not provide any radical changes from the past. It is plausibly argued 
that “although, the soft law approach clearly failed to prevent or resolve 
the GFC, the solution adopted so far is [a] harder version of the soft law 
approach.”99 Standard-setting remains the job of the TRNs such as the 
BCBS, IOSCO, etcetera, albeit under closer coordination through the 
FSB. As a result, the emerging architecture leaves largely unaddressed 
the regulatory and supervisory challenges already discussed. In addition, 
yet again, the architecture neglects the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between financial stability and economic development. Therefore, the 
important reforms outlined above might just produce another failure due 
to the timidity of interventions pertinent to governance structures, ending 
up as an excellent means for fighting the causes of the last crisis. 
The need for forward-looking governance structures that will pro-
vide formal systemic risk and G-SIFI supervision as well as an interna-
tional cross-border resolution regime for those financial institutions is as 
great as ever. In this respect, the dynamic roles assumed by the major 
parts of emerging architecture, such as the FSB and the IMF, could pave 
the way for more radical and evolutionary reforms, which, in the context 
of an international treaty, could provide effective solutions to the critical 
challenges international finance continues to raise. 
III. CAN SOFT-LAW FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE MEET THE CHALLENGES? 
LESSONS FROM THE GFC 
This Part of the Article will provide a concise analysis of the effec-
tiveness of soft-law structures underpinning global financial governance. 
In particular, based on lessons learnt in the course of the GFC, it will 
ascertain whether present arrangements would be sufficient to avert or 
manage a global crisis of similar magnitude in the future. 
A. Overview 
TRNs and soft law have been hailed as important mechanisms to 
resolve the regulatory coordination and enforcement challenges posed by 
globalization in a number of areas ranging from governance of biogenet-
ic research to financial regulation. TRN theory has its origins in a “soft 
power” view of international relations, which was pioneered by leading 
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liberal political theorists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.100 Their anal-
ysis was reconceptualized and applied in a number of areas, where inter-
national cooperation was of essence, by Anne Marie Slaughter and other 
international relations scholars. They have proposed a “soft form” of in-
ternational cooperation through TRNs as an effective solution to global 
problems. Slaughter and others have conceived trans-governmental net-
works that, apart from regulatory networks, legislators, judges, and en-
forcement officials, also include “cooperative arrangements across bor-
ders” that “seek to respond to global issues.”101 
TRNs and soft law present, according to their proponents, two dis-
tinct advantages. They lower the cost of contracting102 and entail reduced 
loss of sovereignty, as they are less restrictive and easier to defect than a 
(hard law) international treaty.103 TRNs are also assumed to be a better 
mechanism to resolve, inter alia, cross-border coordination and enforce-
ment conundrums, especially where issues of sovereignty and national 
interest protection are of paramount concern. Due to their organizational 
and legal flexibility, informal transnational networks are thought to be 
better placed to produce effective rules and standards for the global mar-
ketplace and to be more effective implementation channels than hard law 
structures. 
On the other hand, the public-private and national-international na-
ture of the economic activities associated with the operation of global 
financial markets often presents intractable challenges and dilemmas. 
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Yet, as explained in the previous section, while TRNs are at the heart of 
global financial governance, these and IFSs are not based on any form of 
legally binding treaties. 
B. Shortcomings in Regulatory Coordination 
The view that TRNs are the solution to the regulatory challenges 
facing financial markets is not universally accepted. Strong voices have 
highlighted the multitude of weaknesses associated with the operation of 
TRNs as global financial regulators. First, a national regulator’s principal 
concern is furthering not global policy objectives but the protection and 
advancement of the national industry’s interests. There is no evidence of 
the famed dual duty of regulators within TRNs to both domestic and 
global interests.104 But even if there was evidence of such duty, they 
would still not be entirely impartial actors dedicated to the protection of 
global public goods such as financial stability.105 This finding should 
have been enough to place TRNs under a different light because every 
rule or standard proposed by TRNs, at least in the realm of international 
finance, is bound to have distributional consequences that might affect 
domestic interests and, above all, domestic financial stability and fiscal 
outlay. 
International regulatory cooperation often involves significant con-
flicts over the distributive consequences of new standards because the 
costs and benefits of alternative proposals fall on different states. As de-
veloped countries dominate the TRNs, it is not surprising, although ineq-
uitable, that these conflicts are resolved in favor of the industries domi-
nated by TRN members, even where this is at the expense of better regu-
latory outcomes. The most significant distribution concerns are raised by 
capital market’s disclosure, market integrity rules and cross-border crisis 
management and bank resolution operations. The latter became rather 
common during the GFC. Even regarding the regulation of systemic risk, 
approaches may differ according to national economic interest and the 
desire to protect key economic sectors or the domestic financial services 
                                                            
 104. On the assumption that such a duty exists, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated 
Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & 
OPPOSITION 159, 163 (2004). 
 105. E.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 162 (2009) (“The impact of domestic pressures on regulatory networks is most 
dramatically illustrated by instances of direct political intervention. The Basel II negotiations pro-
vide a vivid example: it is perfectly clear that Chancellor Schroeder would not have permitted Ger-
man banking regulators to agree to rules that would harm SMEs, even if they had thought the policy 
would improve global financial stability.”). 
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industry.106 For instance, some countries may prove net exporters of risk 
because of the (high risk) nature of products sold by national institutions, 
the business practices they follow (for example, excessive leverage, re-
laxed credit controls), or both, while maintaining a cross-border pres-
ence. In these instances, in the absence of a predetermined legally bind-
ing framework, regulators have very little incentive to cooperate and 
adopt more stringent regulatory standards or, for instance, take Prompt 
Corrective Action (PCA). Similarly, some smaller, capital-poor countries 
may have little other means than weak regulations to attract capital. 
Without a better alternative for attracting income from financial business, 
they may feel that maintaining weaker standards gives them a competi-
tive edge and benefits that exceed the risk of fraud or institutional failure. 
A classic example of this behavior was, of course, Iceland.107 
A particular concern is the effect that the endorsement of a particu-
lar standard will have on the competitiveness of its relevant markets.108 
Some regulators may find stringent rules and regulations an effective 
means of attracting firms by allowing them to signal their commitment to 
a sound regulatory system. Meanwhile, other regulators may find it more 
appealing to adopt lower regulatory standards to attract small financial 
firms and investment managers seeking to avoid high regulatory costs. In 
addition, while some regulatory challenges are resolved by TRNs in 
ways that are beneficial to all states, many do not lend themselves to un-
controversial technical solutions. On the contrary, most of the adopted 
standards normally favor the markets or industries of developed coun-
tries participating in the TRNs. A characteristic example is Basel II, 
which, had it been fully implemented, would have adversely affected 
credit flows to the developing world. First, there were problems with the 
implementation of Basel II by the less technically advanced financial 
institutions in emerging market economies. Due to lack of resources and 
                                                            
 106. Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447 (2008). 
 107. See David Carey, Iceland: The Financial and Economic Crisis (OECD, Econ. Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 725, 2009), available at http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/ 
displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2009)66; THORSTEN BECK ET AL., BAILING 
OUT THE BANKS: RECONCILING STABILITY AND COMPETITION—AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-
SUPPORTED SCHEMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2010), available at http://www.cepr.org/ 
pubs/other/Bailing_out_the_banks.pdf. 
 108. Robert Bailey, Basel II and Development Countries: Understanding the Implications 34–
35, 38–39 (London Sch. Econ., Dev. Studies Inst., Working Paper No. 05–71, 2005), available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP71.pdf; see also Stephany Griffith-
Jones & Stephen Spratt, The New Basle Capital Accord and Developing Countries: Issues, Implica-
tions and Policy Proposals (World Inst. for Dev. Econs. Res., Discussion Paper No. 2002/36, 2002), 
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2002/en_GB/ 
dp2002-36/. 
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technical sophistication, these were expected to adhere to the standard-
ized approach of Pillar 1, which required a higher capital cushion and 
thus would raise the costs of developing country banks distorting interna-
tional competition.109 Second, developing country corporations and other 
entities naturally have lower credit ratings, which would attract, under 
Basel II, higher capital charges, reducing credit flows to those econo-
mies.110 
TRNs are institutionally ill-equipped to resolve conflicts that entail 
distributional consequences.111 This argument is evidenced beyond any 
reasonable doubt by the failure to take coordinated rescue and resolution 
action as regards cross-border financial groups, in the absence of a bind-
ing framework for international cooperation and fiscal burden sharing. In 
order to resolve distributive conflicts, international negotiations must 
involve concessions and tradeoffs across areas of national interest and, in 
some cases, threats and other manifestations of power. These tasks are 
not normally entrusted to regulatory agencies but are exercised by gov-
ernment bodies, which will essentially determine the concessions or 
threat of sanctions. Accordingly, TRNs are neither as apolitical as they 
are supposed to be, nor can they be effective monitors without exercise 
of some sort of sovereign power by the governments of participating 
states. 
Although emerging economies may well be affected by internation-
al financial rules, wealthier, developed countries generally have more at 
stake in complex financial rule making.112 For example, some countries 
may have a relatively small or concentrated domestic investor base, and 
therefore they may have less at stake or even less interest in developing 
sophisticated disclosure or investor protection regimes. Thus, while TRN 
theory has assumed relatively seamless coordination among securities 
regulators, this is hardly the case. On the contrary, implementation is 
often the result of the threat of sanctions.113 
                                                            
 109. Bailey, supra note 108. 
 110. Griffith-Jones & Spratt, supra note 108. 
 111. Verdier, supra note 105, at 115. 
 112. Id. at 163 (“In such cases, the resulting standards may be globally efficient, but powerful 
states will enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits. This was also arguably the case when the 
United States and the United Kingdom maneuvered to secure adoption of the Basel I. While the 
higher capital levels mandated by Basel I likely improved global financial stability, the Accord also 
allowed the two sponsors to maintain their competitive position. . . .”). 
 113. Id. (“The presence of distributive problems also creates opportunities for powerful states 
to secure their preferred outcome through incentives and threats, as illustrated by the imposition of 
money laundering and securities fraud rules on OFCs. [Although OFCs strongly preferred lax regu-
lation their] co-operation was secured through threats of sanctions and loss of access to the markets 
on which their financial industry depends. In such cases, the resulting standards may be globally 
efficient, but powerful states will enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits.”). 
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International standard setters do not always provide clear or effec-
tive guidance for emerging challenges or risks. Their pre-GFC standards, 
especially the Basel capital adequacy framework, proved woefully inad-
equate in many ways. This is explained in the next section, including a 
total failure to appreciate the inadequacy of CRAs’ models and their 
glaringly apparent conflicts of interest. Yet, lack of accountability struc-
tures has meant that the failures of Basel I and, especially, Basel II had 
no impact on the standing of BCBS. 
C. All Is Not Well with Private Sector Input 
Some of the aforementioned TRN failures should, in part, be at-
tributed to the quasi-regulatory role assigned to private actors. The input 
of private actors is sometimes based on rather imperfect science and is 
motivated by private interests.114 Namely, TRNs’ excessive reliance on 
private actors’ knowledge and expertise is often misplaced.115 For exam-
ple, the strong push by industry to base capital adequacy standards on a 
risk modeling approach also translated into relentless equity reduction 
practices in favor of debt, which of course led to over-leveraged and se-
verely under-capitalized banks.116 Uncritical endorsement of private sec-
tor expertise and policy preferences also fostered self-regulation in de-
rivatives markets, which proved inadequate to prevent a large-scale fi-
nancial crisis. 
The trouble with excessive reliance on private sector input is not 
just that private actors try to promote their own agenda, a pretty legiti-
mate goal on their part. An even bigger problem is that such uncritical 
endorsement incorrectly assumes that private actors’ knowledge is com-
plete, while in fact it is very fragmentary, often steeped in ignorance,117 
and unheeding of true market conditions.118 These shortcomings are due 
                                                            
 114. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in 
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan 
eds., 2006); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 115. Martin Hellwig, Capital Regulation After the Crisis: Business as Usual?, CESIFO DICE 
REP., July 2010, at 41. 
 116. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE 
TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G20 4 (2010); Hellwig, supra note 115, at 2–4. 
 117. “Blankfein . . . argued that the real problem was that people had not realised they were 
taking excessive risk and that in that case a properly constructed leverage ratio may have been an 
appropriate back-stop against a possible mistake in risk assessment.” EUROFI FINANCIAL FORUM 
2010, CONFERENCE REPORT: OPTIMIZING EU FINANCIAL REFORMS FOR ACHIEVING RESILIENCE, 
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http://www.eurofi.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Eurofi-Brussels-2010-conference-report.pdf 
(summarizing the comments of Lloyd C. Blankfein). Blankfein is, of course, the chairman and chief 
executive officer of the world’s best-known investment bank, Goldman Sachs. 
 118. Julia Black has noted:  
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to two factors. First, private actors, deeply entrenched themselves in the 
constantly changing winds of the markets, do not have enough incentives 
to gather diverse pieces of data that would provide a more complete pic-
ture of the markets, when such data covers areas beyond their immediate 
business needs. Second, market conditions often differ from what is ex-
pected in equilibrium. However, disequilibrium conditions are as much 
the product of market actors’ own behavior as of anything else. 
Private actors’ inadvertent myopia in disequilibrium is witnessed 
beyond reasonable doubt by their frequent inability to either identify an 
asset bubble or react to it. Normally, this is due to two factors. First, pri-
vate actors’ cognitive biases and socio-psychological pressures distort 
valuations and trigger strategic trade behavior (herding), which in turn 
intensifies disequilibrium conditions.119 Second, the actions of private 
actors themselves create the market conditions under scrutiny, a phe-
nomenon known as reflexivity.120 In those cases, requesting private ac-
tors to accurately observe the impact of their own actions and intentions 
in relaying their analysis of market conditions to their regulatory masters 
                                                                                                                                     
There is a growing recognition that regulators do not have the resources necessary by 
way of information, tools and technologies, organisational capacities, leverage, and, at 
the international level in particular, legitimacy and authority to perform regulation effec-
tively. However, this is also matched by a recognition that firms and markets do not pos-
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Julia Black, Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Capacities, Coordination and 
Learning 16 (London Sch. Econ., Law, Soc’y & Econ., Working Paper No. 18/2010, 2010), availa-
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 119. See Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the Global Regulation of Short Sales, Why 
Prohibition is Inefficient and Disclosure Insufficient, 15(2) STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 376, 376–425 
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tion Regulation: An Evolutionary Approach (May 2006) [hereinafter Avougleas, Cognitive Biases] 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133214. 
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context of financial markets:  
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view to financial markets] the [prevailing] interpretation of the way financial markets op-
erate is severely distorted. . . . Thinking participants cannot act on the basis of 
knowledge. Knowledge presupposes facts which occur independently of the statements 
which refer to them; but being a participant implies that one’s decisions influence the 
outcome. Therefore, the situation participants have to deal with does not consist of facts 
independently given but facts which will be shaped by the decision of the participants. 
There is an active relationship between thinking and reality. . . . Reflexivity is, in effect, a 
two-way feedback mechanism in which reality helps shape the participants’ thinking and 
the participants’ thinking helps shape reality. . . . 
George Soros, Chairman, Soros Fund Mgmt., Remarks at Mass. Inst. of Tech.: Theory of Reflexivity 
(Apr. 26, 1994). 
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and partners is stretching perceptions of private actors’ cognitive ability 
beyond the limits of credulity. 
For example, I have argued elsewhere that private sector inability 
(or unwillingness) to close regulators’ knowledge gap meant that the fi-
nancial revolution was very little understood and much misunderstood by 
policymakers and supervisors, stretching their cognitive capacity to a 
breaking point.121 Therefore, TRNs’ information advantages due to wider 
private sector participation may not be overestimated, and the global 
regulatory community should consider establishing more formal struc-
tures when it comes to identifying risks, especially those risks occasion-
ally arising from innovative financial techniques and instruments. 
D. Monitoring and Enforcement of International Financial Standards 
The success of soft-law standards is dependent in large part on the 
ability of regulators and market participants to identify defections and 
deviations from what has been agreed. Monitoring is thus a necessary 
means to facilitate compliance. Only through timely detection of defec-
tion can the disciplining mechanism of reputation loss work effectively. 
Nevertheless, the architecture supporting financial sector monitoring is, 
in many regards, quite weak. For one, the surveillance of compliance 
with international regulatory agreements is available for a relatively fi-
nite range of instruments. Regulatory commitments made by political 
institutions, or through communiqués promulgated by the “G” groupings 
in the wake of their summits, have often been lightly monitored. Similar-
ly, only basic legislative standards promulgated by TRNs are incorpo-
rated into FSAP surveys. 
Even where rules are incorporated into financial sector assessments, 
monitoring of compliance may remain weak. FSAP participation was, for 
example, entirely voluntary for non-IMF and non-World Bank borrow-
ers. Also, data provided to international standard-setting bodies is nor-
mally self-reported by national authorities and is subject to little verifica-
tion. FSAP has provided a weak and defective monitoring mechanism. 
Accordingly, even when they are adopted in a timely manner, TRN 
standards still frequently face enforcement problems, as states are tempt-
ed to defect from the cooperative framework—especially when they are 
under pressure from powerful domestic constituencies.122 Even IOSCO’s 
                                                            
 121. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at ch. 3; see also Black, supra note 118. 
 122. Arguably, it is very hard to see national regulators who have voted in favor of countercy-
clical capital regulations (“the counter-cyclical buffer”) in Basel to restrict bank lending because the 
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record is less solid than it sounds, and most of the convergence has been 
achieved in areas in which major markets had a strong interest.123 Simi-
larly, in the field of fraud and money laundering, the biggest jurisdictions 
seem to have used FATF to impose their will on smaller jurisdictions 
hosting tax havens in order to protect their interests. Rules are also une-
venly enforced.124 Therefore, the informal and nonbinding nature of the 
rules adopted by TRNs and the incapacity to monitor or enforce them 
limit their effectiveness in circumstances where states have incentives to 
defect.125 TRNs in that case are powerless to react without the interven-
tion of governments and the threat of bilateral or multilateral sanctions. 
Incentives to defect do not come bigger than in the context of a major 
international financial crisis, where the resolution of cross-border finan-
cial institutions may entail massive fiscal costs for the participating regu-
lators. 
E. The Issue of Legitimacy 
Another big concern associated with TRNs is their (lack of) legiti-
macy,126 and the identification of actions that could be taken to remedy 
                                                                                                                                     
BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT 
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tina, Brazil) default crisis of 1982. Congress wanted to impose higher capital regulations on US 
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ernance, see Geoffrey R.D. Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Norms, Legitimacy, and Global Financial 
Governance, (ESRC World Econ. & Fin. Programme, Working Paper No. WEF 0013, 2006), avail-
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this defect.127 Two leading liberal scholars have defined legitimacy of 
global governance institutions as follows128: 
“Legitimacy” has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To 
say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to as-
sert that it has the right to rule – where ruling includes promulgating 
rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching 
costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance. An institu-
tion is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely be-
lieved to have the right to rule. 
The “normative view of legitimacy” essentially asks whether any 
international organization or body was established by state actors or or-
ganizations recognized under international law, which, in turn, had the 
competence under national or international law to engage in the action in 
question. Therefore, the perception of legitimacy (“believed to have the 
right to rule”) is the most important. In fact, the thorniest legitimacy 
question attached to TRNs in the field of global finance is not so much 
lack of political controls129 because heads of state and ministers partici-
pate in the G-20 and treasury departments are represented in BCBS. It is 
more an issue of lack of accountability mechanisms because their soft-
law nature does not allow the establishment of accountability structures 
similar to those in place for the United Nations or the WTO. Moreover, 
building global governance organizations merely on the basis of partici-
pating states’ consensus, giving them the right to rule, is not sufficient. 
Even if a relevant body was exclusively based on the consent of demo-
cratic states, and thus democratic accountability structures were ensured, 
the main functions of this body would be discharged by a bureaucracy, 
which would enjoy a wide margin of discretion whether its decisions 
were made at the national or international level.130 Thus, this body would 
not meet the second of the above tests—widely believed to have the right 
to rule. To meet the second test, global governance institutions should 
provide benefits that cannot be provided by states.131 In addition, global 
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governance institutions need to be based on the incorporation of a clear 
set of shared values, but TRN objectives often lack clarity. Finally, being 
a collection of experts and bureaucrats, TRN legitimacy could be 
strengthened through the establishment of some form of indirect ac-
countability to the global polity,132 but formal institutions have proved 
more successful at achieving that. TRNs producing IFSs fall far short of 
satisfying the second test of legitimacy for a host of other reasons. As we 
have already seen, many international standard-setters, like the BCBS, 
“are exclusive in their membership or dominated by a narrow band of 
(usually rich) countries.”133 Even TRNs with very wide and representa-
tive membership like IOSCO may have tight knit cores in terms of poli-
cymaking, such as IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
Regulatory groupthink, mono-dimensionality, and domination by 
larger and more sophisticated members, which represent bigger constitu-
encies and often possess superior expertise, create serious policy implica-
tions for TRNs. First, they are likely to produce standards that favor 
members at the expense of nonmembers. In fact, distributive issues are 
much more likely to be decided in favor of those with direct policy input. 
Second, TRNs are very likely to refrain from adopting standards that do 
not favor their stronger members. For some commentators, this inevita-
ble dominance of TRNs by the more advanced economies, until recently 
the United States and a few E.U. countries, has led to a new form of ex-
traterritorial application of their laws and regulatory traditions.134 
On the other hand, a number of respected scholars argue that, in re-
cent years, open and extensive consultations held by TRNs before the 
promulgation of new standards have largely resolved the issue of legiti-
macy.135 Moreover, G-20, FSB, and BCBS member countries (following 
membership enlargement) do represent the world’s biggest economies, 
and, being hosts to the largest financial services industries, they have 
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more experience and a higher level of expertise in dealing with the most 
important issues of global finance, such as large and complex financial 
institutions and markets for sophisticated financial instruments. 
F. Lessons from the GFC 
1. Introductory Remarks 
Soft law and TRNs are very important and useful components of 
global governance, especially in areas where a strong pooling of sover-
eignty would be regarded as intolerable by states. They also have several 
shortcomings, as explained above. In many ways this form of governance 
for international finance proved largely ineffective. On the other hand, 
criticism of TRNs should not be generalized and care should be taken not 
to diminish the valuable role in information sharing and promotion, 
through soft law, of cooperative forms of governance in a number of oth-
er spheres of transnational interaction. 
Even notable TRN theorists have pointed out that the soft-law 
structures proved to be ineffective, or at best “marginally helpful,” in 
managing the GFC.136 First, Basel capital adequacy standards are widely 
assumed to have seriously contributed both to the buildup and the severi-
ty of the crisis. Second, the lack of formal structures for cross-border 
coordination of crisis management and failing bank resolution generated 
gigantic amounts of confusion and uncertainty resulting in a generalized 
collapse of confidence in the markets, especially after the messy collapse 
and winding up of Lehman Brothers. Finally, the standards themselves 
were in many instances flawed, and, as explained below, they seem to 
have contributed to, instead of prevented, the GFC.137 
2. The Flaws of the Basel Capital Framework 
It has been accurately and consistently argued that the focus of Ba-
sel standards on individual institutions’ financial standing (micro-
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prudential regulation) was flawed.138 Basel capital regulations also 
proved to be problematic in many other areas, mostly because of four 
factors. First, capital standards were very procyclical. Second, the capital 
standards tended also to foster regulatory arbitrage. Third, the Basel I 
and Basel II frameworks totally neglected liquidity risks in the banking 
sector. Fourth, the provision of incentives to adhere to the risk-modeling 
approach encouraged leverage, allowing banks to assume large amounts 
of short-term debt. 
Basel capital requirements also showed a poor appreciation of the 
importance and cost of strong equity cushions. This was due to regulato-
ry arbitrage, whereby riskier assets attracting a higher capital cushion 
were securitized and taken off the balance sheet, as well as poor capture 
of actual risks by the models used, especially by Basel II, which were 
based on industry developed risk management models, especially the so-
called Value at Risk (VaR). VaR had serious shortcomings for a number 
of reasons and probably constituted a flawed way to capture asset riski-
ness.139 First, the model was not based on sound empirical grounds. Its 
timeline was short and thus, in certain asset markets such as housing, 
where prices had been rising constantly for twenty years, it systematical-
ly underestimated the risk of default.140 Second, it failed to capture corre-
lations among assets.141 Third, it did not distinguish between risk and 
uncertainty. As the model assumed normal distributions of events, it 
could not capture tail risk, namely, rare extreme loss events—so-called 
fat tails or black swans—which, in fact, may not be modelable.142 More-
                                                            
 138. MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: GENEVA REPORTS ON WORLD ECON. 11 6–10 (2009), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf. 
 139. For an analytical discussion, see AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at 242–45. 
 140. This statement by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan is characteris-
tic:  
It was the failure to properly price such assets that precipitated the crisis. . . . The modern 
risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, how-
ever, collapsed in the summer of last year [2007] because the data inputted into the risk 
management models generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria. 
Had instead the models been fitted more appropriately to historic periods of stress, capital 
requirements would have been much higher and the financial world would be in far better 
shape today. . . . 
Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t & 
Oversight Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Fed. Re-
serve). 
 141. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT STRENGTHENING 
THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR 37–8 (2009), available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf. 
“The Committee, based on its empirical work, found evidence that asset value correlations were at 
least 25% higher for financial firms than for non-financial firms.” Id. at 38; cf. Hellwig, supra note 
115, at 7. 
 142. It has been accurately observed that  
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over, what risk models could not capture is the very risk that regulation 
should be alert to guard against.143 Fourth, it was very procyclical and 
thus patently unsuitable for use in regulatory models that tried to protect 
financial institutions and the financial system from, inter alia, the risk of 
economic downturns, which is inevitable in all economic cycles. Fifth, it 
focused on defaults, which are less frequent events, and not on the much 
more frequent asset price changes, which may prove as dangerous for 
banks’ financial health.144 Sixth, it failed to capture endogenous risk, 
namely, the risk emanating from the behavior of actors within the sys-
tem, as a response to an exogenous or endogenous development, which 
could lead to contagion and domino phenomena. A domino or cascade 
event can force even perfectly hedged and soundly managed financial 
institutions to fail and is, arguably, the biggest risk for the banking sys-
tem. VaR assumed independence in institutional actions and did not 
measure the impact of each institution’s actions on the behavior of other 
institutions and the market. Namely, it did not capture self-reinforcing 
cycles. 
                                                                                                                                     
[the view that] past distribution patterns carry robust inferences for the probability of fu-
ture patterns is methodologically insecure. It involves applying to the world of social and 
economic relationships a technique drawn from the world of physics, in which a random 
sample of a definitively existing universe of possible events is used to determine the 
probability characteristics, which govern future random samples. But it is unclear wheth-
er this analogy is valid when applied to economic and social relationships, or whether in-
stead, we need to recognise that we are dealing not with mathematically modellable risk, 
but with inherent “Knightian uncertainty.” 
 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 21 (2009) [here-
inafter FSA, REGULATORY RESPONSE], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/ 
dp09_02.pdf. 
 143. See Goodhart, supra note 123, at 165. 
[T]he precept that each individual bank’s own risk management should be brought up to 
the level of, and harmonised with . . . the (best) practices of the most technically ad-
vanced individual banks . . . was wrong for two main associated reasons. First, the risk 
management concerns of individual banks are, and indeed should be, quite different from 
those of regulators. A banker wants to know what his/her individual risk is under normal 
circumstances, 99% of the time. If an extreme shock occurs, it will anyhow be for the au-
thorities to respond. For such normal conditions, the VaR measure is well designed. But 
it does not handle tail-risk adequately. . . . It is the tail risk of such extreme shocks that 
should worry the regulator. 
Id.; see also Jon Danielsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Limits to Risk Modelling, 26 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1252, 1252–72 (2002). 
 144. As Brunnermeier, et al. note:  
[D]efaults need not even be necessary to generate contagion. Price changes themselves 
may be enough. When financial institutions mark their bal- ance sheets to market, chang-
es in prices lead to losses that may be sufficient to transmit the shocks to other institu-
tions even when they do not hold claims against each other. Losses worsen funding li-
quidity for many financial institutions, forcing them to shed even more assets which fur-
ther depresses prices and increases losses, and so on. 
Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 138, at 14 (emphasis added). 
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3. Supervisory Failures, Cross-Border Crisis Management and Resolu-
tion “Too-Big-to-Fail” Institutions 
a. Supervision of Cross-Border Financial Institutions 
The two IFIs, the IMF and the World Bank, are involved in the cur-
rent governance framework for global finance in the process of standard-
setting and monitoring of compliance. However, they lack any kind of 
legal standing to act as global financial regulators. On the other hand, 
TRNs have no supervisory capacity. 
Supervision in financial markets is a competence and function, the 
discharge of which has predominantly been confined within national 
borders. Also, there has not been a clear distinction between two differ-
ent functions of regulation: rulemaking and standard-setting on the one 
hand and supervision on the other—even in the domestic context.145 The 
latter is roughly defined as the day-to-day monitoring of regulated firms’ 
compliance with applicable regulations and imposition of sanctions. This 
was not regarded as a major failing until the eruption of GFC. The fact 
that TRNs were not involved in supervision and had no enforcement 
powers was viewed as an issue of little importance, although certain 
commentators had either highlighted this absence or advocated the need 
for the establishment of a global systemic regulator. The lack of any ca-
pacity to supervise cross-border institutions and of any clear cooperation 
in a crisis management (and burden sharing) framework at the interna-
tional level, which could reconcile home- and host-country interests, be-
came a serious problem during the GFC. 
There are good reasons to believe that at least Icelandic authorities 
(and possibly Irish regulators as well) were particularly permissive regu-
lators, viewing their banks as their national champions. Icelandic banks 
maintained a widespread geographic distribution of assets rather dispro-
portionate to the size of the country’s Gross Domestic Product. But host-
country authorities had no effective tools for early intervention under the 
prevailing framework. Early intervention was, however, exactly what 
was required to avoid placing host-country banking systems under seri-
ous threat.146 
                                                            
 145. See Pan, supra note 86. Perceptive earlier works that drew such a distinction between the 
two different concepts are Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and 
Supervision in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49 (2003); Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, The Fed’s 
New Model of Supervision for “Large Complex Banking Organizations”: Coordinated Risk-Based 
Supervision of Financial Multinationals for International Financial Stability, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 
283, 287–88 (2005). 
 146. See FSA, REGULATORY RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 16, 56, 154. 
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Moreover, where national authorities were being faced with colos-
sal cross-border bank rescue dilemmas and expensive conflicts of inter-
est, MoUs and other soft-law structures could play no meaningful role. 
Characteristic examples are the acrimonious cross-border treatment of 
the failure of Icelandic banks and the messy rescue of Fortis, a large Eu-
ropean bank with a strong presence in three countries.147 Both cases are 
surprising examples, as they happened within or just outside the borders 
of the E.U., the region with the highest level of harmonization of national 
banking laws. 
b. Resolution of Cross-Border Financial Institutions 
Arguably, the most important lesson learned from the collapse of 
Lehman is that, while the business of a banking group is run on an inte-
grated global basis, its corporate structure is highly fragmented and laby-
rinthine. This is normally the result of regulatory and tax arbitrage or 
local legal requirements, or it is put in place to evade legal liability spill-
ing over from one corporate entity to the other within the same group.148 
The Lehman and Fortis cases have highlighted the incompatibility of 
cross-border group structures with national resolution regimes and insol-
vency procedures.149 This is one of the biggest threats to financial global-
ization150 because it has become obvious that, in the absence of clear 
                                                            
 147. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 10–12 (2009). 
 148. Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial 
Conglomerates, Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in XFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BANKING 173–204 (Allen N. Berger, et al. eds., 2010); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 147, at 14–16. 
 149. STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., A SAFER WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM: IMPROVING THE 
RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS, GENEVA REPORT ON WORLD ECON. 12 (2010), available 
at http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Geneva12.pdf. 
 150. One obvious remedy is, of course, to ring-fence branches and subsidiaries in the host 
jurisdiction. But as Goodhart, Schoenmaker, and I have argued, it is unlikely that even ring-fenced 
subsidiaries will survive the reputation contagion of apparent failure, which will cause a retail or 
wholesale creditor run on the subsidiary resulting, in the beginning, severe funding problems and, 
eventually, forced bankruptcy. See E. Avgouleas, C. Goodhart & D. Schoenmaker, Bank Resolution 
Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform, 6 J. FIN. STABILITY (2011). Also, it has been ob-
served that ring-fencing may prove costly and complicate, instead of simplify, cross-border group 
resolutions. The segregation of intra-group internal funding and liquidity flows will create operating 
inefficiencies and may amplify rather than resolve the problem of cross-border bank failures and 
even impose extra costs on a host country’s economy. See Eugenio Cerutti et al., Bankers Without 
Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 10/247, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/ 
wp10247.pdf. 
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cross-border supervisory structures and a single insolvency regime, the 
operation of SIFIs on a cross-border basis entails serious dangers.151 
The European Union has moved toward adoption of a harmonized 
approach to bank resolution and insolvency,152 as the only realistic alter-
native to the coordination chaos and risk of systemic collapse observed 
during the Lehman failure and the Fortis rescue. On the other hand, the 
FSB has published a document containing key attributes that all bank 
insolvency regimes ought to present and advocating a mutual recognition 
approach to cross-border resolutions. However, the mutual recognition 
approach that the FSB champions153 and ensuing uncertainty over the 
quality of local regimes due to absence of binding harmonization pacts, 
means that several of the existing obstacles to cross-border resolution 
will remain intact. 
Another very thorny issue is how to share the burden in the case of 
rescuing a cross-border bank or other financial institution. Using taxpay-
ers’ money in one country to bail out the institutions of another country 
is an unjust approach and often politically untenable. Thus, in the ab-
sence of an international convention (statute) governing the resolution of 
cross-border financial institutions and financial groups, which would be 
backed by explicit and legally binding burden-sharing arrangements, 
progress in this area should be regarded as limited, in spite of the occa-
sional hype. 
IV. THE STATE OF REFORM WITH RESPECT TO BANK REGULATION AND 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
In the previous Part, I gave a brief overview of structural reforms 
taking place at the level of international financial regulation, where soft-
law bodies are being fit into a tighter new architecture that has at its cen-
ter the FBS and, at its apex, the G-20. Structural reforms as a response to 
the GFC have also taken place in most Western economies. The U.S. 
Dodd–Frank Act has established a new macro-prudential regulator, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The structure of financial 
                                                            
 151. JACOPO CARMASSI ET AL., OVERCOMING TOO BIG TO FAIL: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
TO LIMIT MORAL HAZARD AND FREE RIDING IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2010), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/14484/1/TFR_Bank_Crisis_Resolution.pdf. 
 152. EUROPEAN COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENT FIRMS AND 
AMENDING COUNCIL DIRECTIVES 77/91/EEC AND 82/891/EC, DIRECTIVES 2001/24/EC, 
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 153. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
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supervision has radically changed in the European Union as well with the 
introduction of the European System of Financial Supervisors. Even 
more wide-ranging have been the reforms to the substantive rules gov-
erning the financial sector. The Dodd–Frank Act and the E.U. legislators 
have brought about sweeping changes as regards the regulation, supervi-
sion, and resolution of large banks and other SIFIs, OTC derivatives 
trading, and ratings production by the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). In 
addition, the BCBS has produced a radically upgraded capital, liquidity, 
and leverage regulation. I provide in this Part an analytical discussion of 
the most important of these reforms. As the new regulations are rather 
labyrinthine, I provide below brief summaries as an introduction before 
moving to more detailed analysis. 
A. Summary of Reforms in the United States and the European Union 
1. The U.S. Reforms 
The Dodd–Frank Act (the Act) was enacted on July 9, 2010, after a 
prolonged period of public and Congressional debate.154 The final Act 
was in many respects the culmination of several political compromises155 
and has since become the subject of serious criticism from both sides of 
the increasingly polarized political landscape in the United States. The 
main goal of the Act is to address the risks that relate to eventual failure 
of “too-big-to-fail institutions” (SIFIs) and the risks relating to financial 
innovation and the shadow-banking sector. It also tries to create a strict 
framework for consumer protection, including the establishment of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), in order to avoid a re-
peat of the sub-prime mortgage scandal. 
With respect to SIFI regulation, the Act’s main innovation is the 
creation of a number of new regulators and establishment of a new reso-
                                                            
 154. The Dodd–Frank Act is a 2,300-page long document. A number of U.S. law firms have 
released extensive summaries of, and commentary on, the Act. See, e.g., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, 
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATE, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 
(2010); MAYER BROWN, UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION: THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010); DAVIS POLK, SUMMARY 
OF THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, PASSED BY THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JUNE 30, 2010 (2010). For a good analysis of the issues Dodd–
Frank attempts to regulate and the policy and regulatory tools that it employs, see REGULATING 
WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Viral 
Acharya et al. eds., 2011). An excellent analysis of the various aspects of the Dodd–Frank Act is 
provided in DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
 155. For the political battles surrounding the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act and its under-
ling political goals, see David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd–Frank Act 
and its (Unintended) Consequences 1–4 (Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 
10–21, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690979. 
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lution regime that will be dedicated to systemically important institutions 
regardless of whether they hold a bank license or not. The Act also curbs, 
through the so-called Volcker Rule, the ability of regulated banks to en-
gage in the most speculative forms of investment banking, such as pro-
prietary trading, and reduce their involvement with and exposure to the 
shadow-banking sector. The Act mandates a framework for the standard-
ization of OTC derivatives contracts introducing on exchange trading 
and clearing requirements for most classes of such contracts. While the 
Act is by all accounts a major step forward in the regulation of the U.S. 
financial services industry, it has been validly criticized on three 
grounds. First, it does not eradicate the “too-big-to-fail” problem. Se-
cond, the cost of compliance is very considerable and, thus, the Act’s 
implementation will likely have an adverse impact on the competitive-
ness of the U.S. financial services industry. Third, the Act is largely un-
helpful when it comes to international regulatory cooperation and is 
bound to generate strong regime conflicts and obstacles to supervisory 
coordination through its extraterritorial reach as well as compliance 
loopholes. 
2. Reform in the European Union 
The European Union’s reliance on a supervisory model that was 
centered on national supervisors proved to be terribly flawed, justifying 
those who doubted whether a stable financial system, an integrated fi-
nancial system, and national financial autonomy (so-called financial sta-
bility “trilemma”) are compatible.156 The structures for cooperation, co-
ordination, and consistent application of E.U. law were very weak. They 
were particularly ineffective when it came to managing the challenges 
arising from failing financial institutions operating cross-border both 
within Europe and globally. These exhibited strong links of interconnect-
edness and were major sources of systemic risk for a host of national 
markets. The failure of those institutions also exposed a marked lack of 
trust among national supervisors. Even regulators from neighboring E.U. 
member states, who also had established, via the Lamfalussy Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), a good understanding with 
their counterparts, chose, nevertheless, to follow a national approach 
when it came to dealing with distressed cross-border financial institu-
tions, as in the Icelandic banks’ and Fortis’ cases.157 
                                                            
 156. See Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma, (Duisenberg Sch. of Fin., Working 
Paper No. TI 11-019/DSF 7, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1340395. 
 157. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 3, at ch. 5. 
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In this context, three main problems were identified. First, there 
was a marked lack of any framework for the monitoring of systemic risk 
(macro-prudential oversight) in the entire European Union. Second, the 
loopholes of “home country control” came into sharp focus. The failure 
of Icelandic banks especially exposed the gaps in cross-border supervi-
sion of banking groups in the European Union and the European Eco-
nomic Area (where Iceland belongs) and, in particular, the failure of 
home-country control. Foreign bank branches, which proved to be sys-
temically critical and a menace to the host country’s systemic stability, 
were, nevertheless, supervised by their home regulator.158 Even more 
damning was the fact that the identified loopholes in supervision were 
left unattended while the level of harmonization of national prudential 
regulation regimes was getting increasingly dense. Third, the uncoordi-
nated bank rescues, and especially the Fortis case, highlighted the lack of 
cross-border structures for crisis management and bank resolution. 
These gaps in E.U. financial supervision called for a radical rethink 
of regulatory structures in the European Union. In November 2008, the 
Commission mandated a High-Level Group, chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière, to make recommendations on how to strengthen European 
supervisory arrangements to improve investor, consumer, depositor, and 
taxpayer protection and rebuild trust in the financial system. The group 
identified big gaps in the supervision of E.U. markets, including the ab-
sence of a systemic risk oversight body. The High-Level Group recom-
mended reforms to strengthen the supervision of the E.U. financial sector 
and ways to facilitate consistent implementation of harmonized rules in 
its final report, presented on February 25, 2009 (the de Larosière Re-
port).159 The group recommended the establishment of pan-European 
supervisory structures comprising three European Supervisory Authori-
ties (ESAs)—one for the banking sector, one for the securities sector, 
and one for the insurance and occupational pensions sector—to replace 
the corresponding Lamfalussy process committees (CEBS, CESR, 
CEIOPS). It also recommended the creation of a European Systemic 
Risk Council. 
                                                            
 158. FSA, REGULATORY RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 37–39; HOUSE OF LORDS, THE FUTURE 
OF EU FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: HOME-HOST COUNTRY SUPERVISION (2009), 
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Following the recommendations of the de Larosière Report and 
substantial further consultations, financial supervision in the European 
Union has undergone very extensive reform. The general characteristics 
of the E.U. reforms may be summarized as follows. First, macro-
prudential oversight and systemic risk monitoring have predominantly 
become the job of the newly established European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB).160 Second, the European Union has abolished the last remnants 
of the principles of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition in 
E.U. financial services regulation. The standard-setting competence of 
the new ESAs makes them the central pillars and channels of maximum 
harmonization through their competence to draft the new E.U. regulatory 
standards for financial markets and the provision of financial services 
with a view to establishing common E.U. rulebooks. The ESAs are also 
the monitors of consistent application of harmonized rules at the national 
level.161 Third, certain aspects of the supervision of cross-border groups 
have (implicitly) shifted from home country control to transnational su-
pervisory structures comprising essentially supervisory colleges162 and 
the new ESAs. These changes have made the supervision of cross-border 
financial groups a much more collaborative effort. Fourth, until an E.U.-
wide bank resolution and insolvency regime is implemented with fiscal 
burden sharing arrangements attached to it, the resolution of cross-border 
institutions remains a national responsibility, notwithstanding the collab-
                                                            
 160. Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Twen-
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orative arrangements for crisis management and bank resolution the E.U. 
Commission proposes to implement. 
B. A Radically New Basel Accord 
1. The Shift to Macro-prudential Regulation 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the BCBS has radically redesigned its 
capital adequacy standards, and it has introduced a new supervisory 
framework to regulate liquidity (adequacy) and a global leverage ratio.163 
BCBS has also issued standards to improve risk management and gov-
ernance in the banking sector. The main objective of the new capital 
measures introduced by Basel III is to resolve the chronic problem of 
bank under-capitalization, a widespread phenomenon during the crisis, 
which led to a large number of bailouts. This behavior was also a by-
product of the application of the previous Basel Capital Accords.164 Basel 
III aims to ensure that banks are able to withstand the type of stress expe-
rienced during the GFC, including banks’ exposure to the economic cy-
cle, bubbles, and other macroeconomic developments. The preceding 
Basel framework was exclusively reliant on micro-prudential regulation 
measures, although micro-prudential regulation sees risk as exogenous, 
caused by the actions of individual financial institutions, and it “neglects 
the systemic implications of common behaviour” of banks in the econo-
my. The GFC has not only underscored the importance of resilient finan-
cial institutions for the stability of the system, since individual institution 
failure can always trigger a cascade effect due to loss of confidence, but 
also has highlighted the importance of guarding against endogenous risks 
to the system. For instance, prudent decisions to raise new funds or sell 
assets made by individual institutions can create negative (liquidity and 
fire sales) externalities with the potential to destabilize the financial sys-
tem. The new Accord has both a micro-prudential focus and a macro-
prudential focus. Therefore, it aims to enhance bank resilience at periods 
of stress and address system-wide risks as well as the procyclical ampli-
fication of these risks over time.165 
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However, defining the actual role, tools, and boundaries of macro-
prudential policy is not as straightforward as it might sound in spite of 
the significance this policy has acquired in the surveillance and rein-
forcement of the stability of national financial systems and thus of the 
international financial system.166 Macro-prudential policy is a comple-
ment to micro-prudential policy, and it interacts with other types of pub-
lic policy that have an impact on financial stability, such as monetary or 
fiscal policy—but it is no substitute for them.167 Therefore, the role of 
macro-prudential policy is not to manage (or dampen) aggregate demand. 
When it comes to safeguarding macro-economic stability, it is no substi-
tute for monetary and fiscal policies. Macro-prudential policy may not 
act as a defense against inflation or macro-economic imbalances, and it 
merely intends to buttress the stability of the financial system by control-
ling the credit growth that normally leads to asset price growth, which in 
combination with increasing risk appetite, often driven by irrational exu-
berance, is a fundamental source of financial instability. 
There are three defining elements of macro-prudential policy. First, 
its objective is to limit systemic or system-wide financial risk. Second, 
its analytical focus is the financial system as a whole and its interactions 
with the real economy. Third, the set of powers and instruments used for 
this purpose and their governance are, namely, prudential tools and those 
specifically assigned to macro-prudential authorities. 
The FSB, IMF, and BIS hold that nonprudential tools are part of the 
macro-prudential policy toolkit only if they target, on a continuous basis, 
systemic risk and are part of the institutional framework used to “conduct 
macro-prudential policy.”168 A key component of successful macro-
prudential policies is effective diagnosis of systemic risk buildup.169 
                                                                                                                                     
Rajan & Jeremy Stein, Rethinking Capital Regulation 21–23 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/KashyapRajanStein.08.08. 08.pdf. 
 166. In the Seoul G-20 Summit in November 2010, G-20 Leaders asked the FSB, IMF, and 
BIS for a joint report, elaborating on progress achieved in identification of best practices on macro-
prudential policy frameworks. In February 2011, the three organizations provided a first report de-
fining the basic elements of macro-prudential policies and summarizing the work underway interna-
tionally and nationally to develop effective macro-prudential policies and frameworks. See FIN. 
STABILITY BD., MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS, UPDATE TO G20 FINANCE 
MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (2011). 
 167. Id. at 2. 
 168. Id. 
 169. “Macroprudential polices aim to address two dimensions of system-wide risk: first, the 
evolution of system-wide risk over time—the ‘time dimension’; and second, the distribution of risk 
in the financial system at a given point in time—the ‘cross-sectional dimension.’” Id. Moreover, “the 
key issue in the cross-sectional dimension is to reduce systemic risk concentrations, which can arise 
from similar exposures across financial institutions (from assets, liabilities, dependence on common 
services) or because of the direct balance-sheet linkages among them (e.g., counterparty risk).” Id. at 
3. 
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BCBS also intends to limit interconnectedness. According to 
BCBS, several of the Basel III capital requirements, which mitigate risks 
arising from firm-level exposures, also help to address systemic risk and 
interconnectedness. These include: (1) capital incentives for banks to use 
central counterparties for OTC derivatives; (2) higher capital require-
ments for trading and derivative activities, as well as complex securitiza-
tions and off-balance sheet exposures (for example, structured invest-
ment vehicles); (3) higher capital requirements for inter-financial sector 
exposures; and (4) the introduction of liquidity requirements that penal-
ize excessive reliance on short-term, interbank funding to support longer 
dated assets. 
A further consideration that has been voiced in consultations that go 
beyond the Basel III framework is whether a tailor-made system of pro-
tections should be extended to certain institutions that may have systemic 
importance.170 BCBS has developed a proposal on a methodology com-
prising both quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the systemic 
importance of financial institutions at a global level,171 which the FSB 
has endorsed.172 Regulatory proposals addressing the problem of G-
SIFIs173 by means of a coordinated cross-border resolution regimes and 
contingent capital instruments. 
2. New Capital and Liquidity Regulations 
 Basel III introduces higher levels of capital for banks. First, the 
minimum requirement for common equity, which is regarded as the best 
form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the 2% level of the 
previous Basel Accords, before the application of regulatory adjustments, 
to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) after the application of stricter 
adjustments. To this shall be added a capital conservation buffer of up to 
2.5% of RWAs, which will bring the total minimum of common equity 
                                                            
 170. Jean-Charles Rochet, Systemic Risk: Changing the Regulatory Perspective, 6 INT’L J. 
CENT. BANKING 259, 259–76 (2010). In the Seoul G-20 Summit, held on November 12, 2010, the 
G-20 Leaders endorsed a requirement that SIFIs, initially in particular G-SIFIs, should have higher 
loss absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risks that these firms pose to the global financial sys-
tem. See G20 SEOUL SUMMIT, THE SEOUL SUMMIT DOCUMENT 7 (2010). 
 171. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Measures for Global Systemically 
Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (June 25, 2011) (on 
file with author); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING MORAL HAZARD POSED BY 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS—INTERIM REPORT TO G20 LEADERS 5 
(2010) [hereinafter FSB, REDUCING MORAL HAZARD], available at www.financialstability 
board.org/publications/r_100627b.pdf. 
 172. FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY—REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (2011). 
 173. See FSB, REDUCING MORAL HAZARD, supra note 171. 
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in bank capital to 7% of RWAs by 2019, when all reforms will have been 
implemented. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common 
equity and other qualifying financial instruments, selected on the basis of 
strict criteria, that give them loss absorption capacity equal to equity, will 
increase from 4% to 6% (before factoring in the conservation buffer). 
This higher level of capital is coupled with a stricter definition of com-
mon equity and an increase in capital requirements for trading activities, 
counterparty credit risk and capital markets-related activities, for which a 
higher capital charge shall apply. Furthermore, Basel III gives supervi-
sors the discretion to require additional capital buffers during periods of 
excess credit growth in order to contain bubbles (countercyclical buffer). 
In addition, competent supervisors may require systemically important 
banks to increase their loss absorbency capacity. 
Incontrollable procyclical leverage was partly responsible for the 
extreme fragility of the global financial system and the extent and depth 
of the GFC. Basel III is trying to remedy this situation through the wel-
come introduction of restrictions on banks’ leverage. Unlike the Basel III 
regulatory capital framework, which, like its predecessor, remains risk-
based, the new Basel III leverage ratio is a simple number which cap-
tures on- and off-balance sheet exposures and net derivatives positions 
and is not related to any risk adjustment calculations. Namely, the non-
risk-based leverage ratio is meant to serve both as a safety valve and a 
means to contain regulatory arbitrage, which increases leverage through 
off-balance sheet assets transformation, serving as a backstop to the risk-
based capital requirement.174 
The GFC started as a credit crunch, which meant that wholesale 
lending markets became very illiquid, forcing the failure of financial in-
stitutions like Northern Rock, which were highly dependent on short-
term funding. The continuing liquidity hoarding also forced all banks to 
become dependent on central bank liquidity schemes for their short-term 
funding. Lack of any regulatory standards that would require banks to 
hold a minimum of liquid assets as liquidity reserves came to be regarded 
as one of the most important loopholes of the Basel capital adequacy re-
gimes. In response, Basel III has introduced minimum liquidity standards 
to make banks more resilient to potential short-term funding disruptions. 
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will require banks to have sufficient 
high-quality liquid assets to withstand a stressed funding scenario that is 
                                                            
 174. “The use of a supplementary leverage ratio will help contain the build-up of excessive 
leverage in the system. It will also serve as an additional safeguard against attempts to ‘game’ the 
risk-based requirements and will help address model risk.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G20, 
supra note 116, at 5. 
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specified by supervisors over a period of thirty calendar days. Basel III 
liquidity standards also address the longer-term structural liquidity mis-
matches normally encountered in bank balance sheets, which, in part, are 
due to the business of banking that mainly consists of transforming short-
term liabilities (deposits) to long-term assets (loans). Thus, the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR) will serve as a measure to address longer-term 
(structural) liquidity mismatches. Banks will have to show that they can 
provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities over a 
period of one year. NSFR covers the entire balance sheet and its clear 
objective is to incentivize banks to use stable sources of funding. 
V. AN INSTITUTIONAL BIG BANG FOR GLOBAL FINANCE 
Part V sets out this Article’s proposal for the reform of global fi-
nancial governance. It explains the rationale for a radical reform of glob-
al financial governance and outlines the main tenets and objectives of 
such a new governance structure for global finance. 
A. Rationale 
The aforementioned regulatory reforms might prove of variable ef-
fectiveness but still are doubtlessly a marked improvement over previous 
arrangements in a number of areas, including OTC derivatives trading, 
financial institution resilience, and national and regional systemic risk 
monitoring. However, said reforms provide limited comfort when it 
comes to cross-border supervision of large systemically important cross-
border financial institutions, management of emerging risks, due to un-
predictable combinations or correlations of forces unleashed or shaped 
by financial innovation with other market and real economy forces, and 
resolution of cross-border financial groups.  
 A closer examination of recent reforms for the supervision of 
systemic risks in the European Union and the United States would reveal 
two awkward truths. First, their mandate is inevitably limited to the U.S. 
and E.U. borders. Accordingly, it is still open to question which authori-
ty, if any, is responsible for the protection of global systemic stability. 
Second, although both the U.S. and E.U. regimes will be geared toward 
global macro-prudential developments, from the movement of interest 
rates in other countries or regions to sovereign debt, they do not possess 
the tools to properly monitor the biggest channel of credit intermediation 
in the world: the shadow-banking sector.175 They also lack any power of 
intervention in those markets. These shortcomings could undermine, 
                                                            
 175. The risks of shadow banking were analytically are discussed in FSB, SHADOW BANKING, 
supra note 4. 
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through regulatory arbitrage, current regulatory efforts to create a safer 
financial system in very effective and invisible ways. For instance, it 
gives ample opportunity for regulated entities to evade the stricter lever-
age and liquidity requirements imposed by Basel III.176 
Despite recent reforms, many gaps remain in the supervision of 
large financial institutions and groups operating on a global basis. These 
fractures would almost certainly lead to three insurmountable problems 
that would make the operation of G-SIFIs a continuous source of moral 
hazard, notwithstanding the important new regulations that are underway 
to limit it. First, while the cross-border operation of financial institutions 
can give rise to cross-border contagion leading to a generalized financial 
crisis,177 the incentives of the home supervisor to prevent this outcome 
could possibly be weak. As the collapse of the Icelandic banks has 
shown, home-country supervisors are certain to face weak incentives to 
intervene promptly, when the main asset or deposit base of the institution 
in trouble is in another jurisdiction. Supervisory colleges might make 
exchanges of information smoother, facilitating supervision, but they are 
unlikely to prove an effective crisis management and resolution mecha-
nism. Because colleges do not have power of intervention, especially as 
it relates to the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) and resolution, it is un-
likely that home supervisors will be forced to act when they stand to lose 
reputation and money (from the deposit insurance fund, the resolution 
fund, or due to a public bailout), in order to protect or rescue depositors 
or other creditors of the financial institution who are located in other ju-
risdictions. It should be noted that this was widespread behavior during 
the GFC and it is not an assumption based on a theoretical model.178 In 
addition, in the absence of a unitary supervision regime, regulatory coor-
dination between home and host authorities is bound to be slow and in-
                                                            
 176. Id. at 8 (“If parts of the shadow banking system are able to operate without internalising 
the true cost of its risks and thus gain a funding advantage relative to banks where regulation aims to 
achieve such an internalisation, this is likely to create opportunities for arbitrage that might under-
mine bank regulation and lead to a build-up of additional leverage and risks in the system. Moreover, 
banks themselves may use shadow banking entities to increase leverage and find ways to circumvent 
their regulatory capital or liquidity requirements.”). 
 177. For a good analysis of contagion channels opened by the cross-border operations of finan-
cial institutions, see Hans Degryse et al., The Impact of Cross-Border Exposures on Financial Con-
tagion, in FINANCIAL REGULATION AT THE CROSSROADS, IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPERVISION, 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND TRADE 26–32 (Panagiotis Delimatsis & Nils Herger eds., 2011). 
 178. “During the current crisis one of the most commonly observed phenomena was discrimi-
nation against host country/foreign borrower.” See U.N. COMM’N ON REFORMS OF INT’L MONETARY 
& FIN. SYS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON REFORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 56 
(2009) [hereinafter, U.N. EXPERTS’ REPORT]. In addition, in the tightly interconnected world of 
modern market economies regulatory forbearance in the home country can have a debilitating impact 
on economic growth in the host country. Id. 
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coherent due to their conflicting objectives.179 Second, inconsistent im-
plementation and application of the new Basel III rules would more or 
less mean that different regulatory arbitrage channels are bound to open, 
undermining the effectiveness of reforms.180 Third, the multitude of na-
tional regulators that shall be involved in the calculation and application 
of the countercyclical buffer to G-SIFIs will prove to be an obstacle to its 
effective and consistent application to these institutions.181 
Moreover, there is no crisis if one big group of stakeholders in fi-
nancial markets do not lose their rational calm and become irrationally 
risk averse and panic sellers, regardless of whether they are sophisticated 
investors and creditors or the general public. At the same time, wide-
spread herding is an ever-present characteristic in all bubbles.182 There is 
little doubt that this sort of herding is triggered or boosted by socio-
psychological reasons, whether irrational exuberance or just competition 
for the highest payment package among peer groups. But it may not be 
modeled with any degree of accuracy. Herding behavior is ever-present 
both in periods of growth and decline. In the latter case, the momentum 
game goes into reverse and panicking investors start selling.183 
The need for a global public regulatory policy and risk knowledge 
body is even bigger in light of the marked and continuous criticism di-
rected at CRAs who are the private sector’s financial risk knowledge 
processors and assessors in the global marketplace. Apart from the multi-
tude of other flaws, CRA ratings also seem to be unpardonably 
procyclical or tend to de facto dictate international public policy. In the 
context of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, CRAs have plausibly been 
                                                            
 179. See CARMINE LAMANDA ET AL., UNICREDIT GROUP FORUM ON FINANCIAL CROSSBORDER 
GROUPS, DISCUSSION PAPER: CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE: WHAT REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION? 8 (2009).  
During the financial crisis the situation of the banking system was assessed mainly at the 
national level and remedial action was also defined at country level in the European Un-
ion (EU). This may have prevented the efficient use of private resources and may have 
increased the overall cost to public finances. Coordination and cooperation between na-
tional supervisors have proved ineffective in the crisis management of multinational fi-
nancial institutions where speediness was required (Fortis). 
Id. 
 180. See Capital and Liquidity Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th 
Cong. (2011) (testimony of Daniel K. Tarullo, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm. 
 181. For a discussion of this issue and an insightful discussion of the several fractures present-
ed by the emerging financial architecture, see Barry Eichengreen, Keynote Address at the Annual 
Research Conference of the Bank of Korea 2–4 (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/Reforming_Intl_Arch_2011_Ed.pdf. 
 182. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBER Z. ALLIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISIS (5th ed. 2005). 
 183. For a discussion of how this can translate into escalating volumes of short sales, see 
Avgouleas, New Framework, supra note 119, at 376–425. 
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accused of creating a string of self-fulfilling prophecies with their ag-
gressive downgrading of E.U. sovereign borrowers.184 
Finally, the aforementioned U.S. and E.U. reforms in the field of 
bank resolution as well IMF185 and FSB proposals constitute a significant 
step forward, especially with respect to the orderly resolution of SIFIs 
with minimum involvement of public funding to minimize moral hazard. 
Yet another big problem remains that of the cross-border resolution of 
financial groups. There is nothing in the present reforms that provides a 
convincing answer to this problem, which is further intensified by the 
lack of a single regime for the resolution of cross-border financial groups 
on a unitary basis instead of holding separate proceedings for each group 
entity with a different legal personality. 
B. The Proposed Governance Model 
The global financial governance model I outline below constitutes a 
global regulatory “big bang,” but it is not a new Bretton Woods, nor is it 
the answer to other global economic challenges, such as trade imbalanc-
es. For a number of years, clear lines of responsibility and expertise have 
developed in the various corners of global financial governance. If one 
examines them carefully and puts the fragmented lines together, they 
automatically provide a rough guide to what is the right path to reform. 
The governance model presented here has also considered similar efforts 
to chart a global financial governance model originating from other aca-
demic works, yet it is sharply different from and farther reaching than 
previous proposals.186 Finally, it is based on, as it ought to be, knowledge 
we now have about: (1) the workings of global finance; (2) the causes of 
the GFC and the contours of the financial revolution; and (3) the other 
challenges modern markets and economies face such as the widespread 
moral hazard too-big-to-fail institutions give rise to and the development 
objective. If this can be achieved, then the resulting governance frame-
work for global finance would only require minimal expenditure and po-
litically manageable tinkering with existing international arrangements. 
                                                            
 184. See Dirk Kurbjuweit, Essay: Die Politik im Griff der Finanzmärkte, 22 DER SPIEGEL 
(2011); OECD Joins Criticism of Credit Rating Agencies, EUBUSINESS.COM (July 7, 2011), 
www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/oecd-eurozone-debt.b5x/. 
 185. INT’L MONETARY FUND, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS—A PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED COORDINATION (2010). 
 186. Among the most comprehensive ones are the U.N. Commission of Experts’ proposal for 
the establishment of a Global Economic Coordination Council (see U.N. EXPERTS’ REPORT, supra 
note 178, at 87) and John Eatwell’s for the establishment of a global prudential (systemic risk) au-
thority, suggested in many works—the most recent of which is KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL 
DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK (2006). 
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1. General Principles: The Importance of Shared Values 
The existence of a set of commonly accepted shared values is of 
cardinal importance for both the effectiveness and legitimacy of a multi-
layered governance structure.187 The same applies to the nexus of rela-
tionships between the proposed supranational governance system and 
member states and other constituents, such as the financial institutions 
overseen by the scheme. Therefore, the statutes of the bodies involved in 
the proposed system would have to be amended, making all four organi-
zations accountable, for their regulatory mandate to a Treaty-established 
governing council of twenty-five representatives. This council would 
comprise of the G-20 members (Ministers or Heads of State), the Euro-
pean Union, as an organization separate from its members, the United 
Nations, as an organization separate from its members, the World Bank, 
and the three most important national economies from those that are not 
represented in the G-20. The governing council could be convened every 
six months or whenever important matters have to be discussed. In addi-
tion, the head of the governing council, a post held by members of the 
governing council on a rotating basis, would have to file an annual report 
about the work of the new authorities before the U.N. General Assembly. 
In addition, key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should be sit-
ting on the board of the financial policy authority and even be given vot-
ing rights when debating issues within the NGOs’ areas of expertise. 
Within the proposed structure, the four authorities would be of 
equal status and they would be mandated to cooperate in full, especially 
when it comes to exchange of information, initiation of joint regulatory 
action, or processing and evaluating data. The important decisions of the 
suggested system of global financial governance would be jointly decid-
ed by the heads of the four authorities. However, each authority would 
have the decisive vote in its respective governance field: systemic risk 
supervision, micro-prudential supervision, regulation production and res-
olution. Any critical disagreements would be referred to the chairman of 
the governing council or the council plenary, but this right would cover 
only planning decisions and not instances where speedy action would be 
required, such as imposition of sanctions, prevention of activities that 
threaten systemic stability, or initiation of resolution proceedings. Natu-
rally, in the process more detailed rules would have to be instilled to al-
low the system to take effective and responsible action without fears of 
abuse. Thus, the system would eventually develop its own set of global 
                                                            
 187. Thomas Cottier, Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict, 16(2) IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647 (2009); Weber, supra note 134, at 683–704. 
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administrative law rules. These arrangements would provide clarity in 
the relationship between the different authorities of the proposed scheme. 
The scheme could not come into existence unless G-20 countries, 
the rest of the E.U. members, and other key economies sign an interna-
tional treaty establishing a supranational governance structure for global 
finance. Thus, it would become mandatory for participating jurisdictions. 
Beyond participating members the scheme would be voluntary. Unsur-
prisingly, if all G-20 economies and the rest of the European Union sub-
scribe to the new governance scheme, following the signing of an inter-
national agreement, it would be impossible for the rest of the world not 
to join. Apart from the quality and credibility mark lent to institutions 
supervised under the scheme, the new governance system would also 
provide a further advantage. It is suggested that the scheme should pro-
vide to institutions falling under its remit full freedom of establishment 
in foreign jurisdictions and freedom to offer services on a cross-border 
basis, subject to local rules of conduct. Namely, it is proposed to give 
institutions governed by the scheme a “single passport” facility similar to 
that granted by E.U. member states to any financial institution licensed in 
the European Union. 
The scheme would only be able to provide this facility if WTO sig-
natories agreed to a modification in the GATS rendering the “prudential 
regulation carve out” inapplicable for financial institutions governed by 
the proposed governance scheme. This should not prove an insurmounta-
ble problem, because, with the implementation of the suggested scheme, 
authorities would be taking important steps to safeguard systemic stabil-
ity. This further liberalization of global trade in financial services should 
be able to return to the WTO negotiations agenda. The departure point 
for holding the regulatory bodies of the new structure accountable would 
be their compliance not only with their charters but also with a set of 
general principles that should govern their actions. Several attempts have 
been made to first identify those principles and then define them, also 
with reference to the general principles governing188 the operation of the 
leading international finance TRNs such as IOSCO.189 In this context, I 
view three principles as beyond dispute. These are the need to: 
(1) safeguard the global public good of financial stability; 
(2) protect the robustness of financial infrastructure; and 
                                                            
 188. Luis Garricano & Rosa Lastra, Towards a New Architecture, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 597, 
606–20 (2010); Weber, supra note 134, at 693–94. 
 189. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2010), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. 
2013] An Institutional Big Bang in Governance 383 
(3) safeguard the integrity of global markets and protect investors 
and consumers of financial services from abusive practices and 
products that may be unsuitable to their risk profile. 
I would suggest adding a fourth principle to this list, even though it 
may only be seen as a supplement to the principle of financial stability. 
All actions of the new system should be cognizant of their impact on the 
ability of open and competitive financial markets to foster economic 
growth, when the objective of financial stability is not compromised. 
However general and abstract this principle might sound at this 
stage, it is a substantial leap forward. After all, it is not meant to provide 
the foundation for litigation or judicial review but to signal to the pro-
posed regulatory bodies and the rest of the world the importance of two 
major issues that were largely underestimated in the past: that, first, fi-
nancial crises and regulators’ actions to prevent or contain them and, se-
cond, open and competitive markets, have significant impact on eco-
nomic development, and this causal link may no longer be ignored.190 
Thus, the importance of the fourth principle should not be underestimat-
ed in terms of the direction that it would provide to the new governance 
structures and the regulations they would produce. 
I have explained elsewhere the possibility of creating very low-risk 
weights under the Basel framework for certain classes of microcredit 
used to pursue an economic activity or buy a productive asset or for 
those that have an embedded borrower monitoring mechanism as group 
loans do.191 Giving these loans a preferential treatment in terms of capital 
regulations would provide a significant impetus to the industry without 
compromising financial stability.192 The repayment rate of such loans 
sometimes touches 100%, but it is very hard for this fact to be clearly 
observed in the absence of written records or credit registries in the coun-
tries where such loans are mostly supplied. The suggested financial poli-
cy regulator could thus undertake its own independent examination of 
repayment rates for such loans, using a variety of formal and informal 
sources. Once satisfied with the outcome, it could produce capital regula-
tions that reflect the reality of low default ratios for group microfinance 
loans. The same regulatory incentives (low capital requirements) route 
could be followed with debt to equity exchange schemes for loans to de-
                                                            
 190. This observation only means that the principle could not be litigated. It is not to say that 
domestic regulatory systems should not incorporate this principle in more binding terms, given the 
importance of law in fostering development. See ROSS CRANSTON, HOW LAW WORKS (2006); 
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 191. See Emilios Avgouleas, Access to Finance, Microfinance, and International Banking 
Regulation: A New Approach to Development, 4 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3–51 (2007). 
 192. See Emilios Avgouleas, International Financial Regulation, Access to Finance, Systemic 
Stability, and Development, 2008 LAWASIA J. 62–76 (2008). 
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veloping countries that go beyond exchanges between creditor and debt-
or nations193 and extend to private institutions, once certainty is estab-
lished, following relevant studies, that financial stability is safeguarded. 
The existence of a set of commonly accepted values for the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of a multi-layered governance system like the 
one proposed here may not be overstressed. It is the foundation of any 
multi-layered system of governance and the material that holds it togeth-
er reinforcing its legitimacy.194 In addition, including the development 
objective in the new governance structure, notwithstanding the suprema-
cy of the financial stability objective, would signal a marked reorienta-
tion of global finance. This is of cardinal importance because it would 
emphasize to global finance operators and to people in developing na-
tions the possibilities global finance holds in resolving several develop-
ment issues. This, in turn, is a very good way to create a community of 
interests between the two and thus broaden the legitimacy of the pro-
posed governance system. Binding global technocratic institutions, like 
the ones proposed here, to a set of “shared values” that would promote 
global welfare objectives is, arguably, an excellent way to enhance their 
legitimacy. 
2. The Macro-prudential Supervisor 
The first pillar of the proposed governance system, the global sys-
temic risk (macro- prudential) supervisor that would monitor both mac-
roeconomic developments and the state of the global financial system, 
seen as encompassing national, regional, and international financial sys-
tems and the shadow-banking sector, should comprise a revamped 
IMF.195 Assigning this duty, by means of an international treaty, to a re-
vamped IMF makes good sense, given also the IMF’s monitoring role 
with respect to national balance of payments and sovereign indebtedness. 
In fact, the entanglement of financial sector stability and solvency with 
sovereign indebtedness and vice versa means that only a revamped IMF 
could effectively discharge the duties of a global macro-prudential su-
pervisor. 
In addition, the IMF should be given the tools to monitor closely 
the shadow-banking sector, in order to close the current supervisory dis-
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continuities, especially as they relate to systemic risk data collection and 
processing. A possible way to do this would be to require all shadow 
banks and hedge funds to register with the IMF and file regular reports 
with it. The scheme should be properly calibrated in terms of asset 
thresholds to capture only important shadow-banking vehicles. Thus, it 
should provide for de minimis exemptions to avoid registration of small 
funds. In the unlikely event that it is proven that sovereign wealth funds 
are a significant source of global market instability, the IMF should be 
given the tools to monitor closely the shadow-banking sector in order to 
close the current supervisory discontinuities, especially systemic risk 
data collection and processing. 
Finally, like the ESRB, the IMF should be entitled to recommend to 
national regulators, or the global micro-prudential supervisor that is sug-
gested here, a course of defensive action against an emerging systemic 
threat. It should also be considered whether, in the context of the same 
treaty, it would be feasible to give the IMF the power that Dodd–Frank 
has already given to FSOC, and the ESRB can exercise indirectly, to re-
quire financial institutions to act upon emerging systemic risks that in its 
judgment give rise to significant concern that justifies adoption of reme-
dial action. In both cases, the global macro-prudential supervisor may 
only be involved where the risk concerned constitutes a threat to more 
than one jurisdiction or has the possibility of creating a cross-border cri-
sis. 
3. The Micro-prudential Supervisor 
Political objections and realities notwithstanding, the only effective 
solution to the regulation of G-SIFIs is to subject international financial 
institutions with a strong cross-border asset or liabilities base (50% and 
higher over total assets) to the direct supervision of a global micro-
prudential authority196 to minimize the scope for regulatory arbitrage. In 
the same mode, a global micro-prudential authority supervising G-SIFIs 
on a consolidated and individualized basis is the only way to apply uni-
formly and effectively the countercyclical buffer provided in Basel III. 
As said earlier, the role of the micro-prudential supervisor could gradual-
ly evolve into a full-fledged global markets regulator, which could even-
tually be asked to expand its remit and exercise oversight over mega-
exchanges and wholesale derivatives markets. Thus, this duty should be 
assigned to a reconstituted FSB, where all national banking and capital 
markets supervisors are already represented. 
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The micro-prudential supervisor of G-SIFIs would monitor compli-
ance with the globally accepted standards, such as the Basel III frame-
work. The micro-prudential supervisor could exercise direct oversight 
over G-SIFIs, whether they are banks or other financial institutions, such 
as insurance companies, with a large cross-border asset or liabilities base. 
Its remit could gradually extend to cover certain wholesale segments of 
global derivatives and securities markets,197 resolving the problem of 
regulation of mega-exchanges. It is suggested that this role should be 
assigned to a reconstituted and expanded FSB, where all G-20 banking 
and capital markets regulators are already represented. The Bank of In-
ternational Settlements (BIS), minus its research division, would have to 
merge with the FSB. Accordingly, the new micro-prudential supervisor 
would essentially operate from existing BIS premises in Basel, ensuring 
its neutrality. 
The global micro-prudential authority would be entitled to ask for 
the assistance of the home country supervisor, which is, in any case, re-
sponsible for monitoring compliance with national rules of conduct. Such 
an arrangement would eliminate scope for confusion or lax supervision 
and weaken home country opposition to the suggested supervisory 
scheme. In fact, of all the parts of the proposed system of governance, 
this is probably the most likely to be fiercely opposed. Strong national 
interest dictates that each country, which serves as the home jurisdiction 
of a big bank or other important financial institution, wishes to be the 
principal regulator of this institution. This is so, first, for reasons of na-
tional economic interest, including job preservation and credit growth in 
the national markets, and, second, for reasons of prestige and influence in 
global economic affairs. Yet the logic of the proposal is too strong to be 
dismissed out of hand. It eliminates the scope for regulatory forbearance 
and provides a framework for consistent application of the new Basel III 
rules, which, apart from regulating capital, extend to the key prudential 
areas of leverage and liquidity regulation. 
Obviously, if there is a possibility for this part of the proposal to 
ever come to fruition, the issue of loss of sovereignty must be managed 
or contained as much as possible. Therefore, when the micro-prudential 
authority would have to take enforcement against a G-SIFI, it would 
need to act as a college—borrowing certain elements from the operation 
of the new E.U. supervisory authorities, allowing key national regulators 
to have a say and making it a truly multilayered governance structure. 
Also, strong accountability mechanisms would have to be established. If 
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the finance minister of the home country is not a member of the new sys-
tem’s governing council, then it should be invited to attend proceedings, 
help with supervision, and influence decisions, although it is the global 
body that would ultimately make the key supervisory decisions. 
4. Global Financial Policy, Regulation, and Risk Knowledge Authority 
The third pillar of the proposed governance structure is a global fi-
nancial policy body that would oversee the TRNs, including the BCBS 
and IOSCO, under arrangements that should be more binding than those 
underpinning the FSB, which currently performs this role. Suggested 
arrangements would not obliterate the importance of the BCBS and of 
other TRNs and their value as importers of private-sector knowledge and 
interlocutors with the private sector. This approach would make the pro-
posed scheme a truly multi-layered and hierarchical governance struc-
ture. 
This third pillar should comprise the OECD and the research divi-
sion of BIS and should be occupied with the task of production of new 
regulation and examination of emerging risks, especially by means of 
various financial innovations. The new body could be called the Global 
Financial Policy, Regulation, and Knowledge Organization and should 
be the directing mind of international financial regulation. The fourth 
pillar should comprise a newly established Global Resolution Authority, 
which should deal with the resolution of big cross-border financial 
groups on the basis of a single resolution and insolvency model. 
TRN standards would have to pass a public interest test set by the 
financial policy body, which would primarily focus on financial stability 
and the ways the draft standard serves the other general principles of the 
proposed governance system. Once endorsed, the standards would be-
come binding, automatically or through mandatory implementation legis-
lation, to all jurisdictions that have opted into the proposed scheme and 
signed the treaty. 
The rulemaking committees of the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association (ISDA), the standard-setting committee of the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and other important private-
sector rulemaking bodies would also come under the umbrella of the fi-
nancial policy regulator, and their standards would have to be endorsed 
by the regulator, provided that the standards met a public interest and 
financial stability test. This reform would secure coherence in standard 
setting and rulemaking in the field of international finance, eliminating 
the scope for rule conflict or uncertainty. The same body should play the 
role of global risk knowledge bank and manager. I have explained else-
where the high costs of lack of knowledge and understanding of the me-
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chanics and potential risks of innovative financial instruments and tech-
niques and their interaction with global economic developments, such as 
market liberalization.198 Neither the risks nor the potential benefits of the 
financial revolution can be properly managed in the absence of painstak-
ing research and even testing innovative financial instruments and tech-
niques in real (or stimulated) market conditions that would allow the 
global investment community to understand them properly and in their 
true dimensions. 
5. A Global Resolution Authority 
The fourth pillar of the proposed system of governance should be a 
global resolution authority operating a single resolution model for G-
SIFIs on a group basis. Its resolution operations should either be support-
ed by burden sharing arrangements between member countries, probably 
using assets to GDP ratios as a basis for contributions,199 or by a global 
resolution fund financed by levying a global tax on G-SIFIs. The best 
way to calculate such a levy would be on the basis of assessment of insti-
tution riskiness using a risk matrix developed jointly with the proposed 
financial policy authority and TRNs, such as the BCBS, that would work 
under its umbrella. Calibrating a levy on G-SIFIs in this manner could 
satisfy both the objective of financing resolution and curbing excessive 
risk-taking.200 
The establishment of a global resolution authority exclusively 
tasked with carrying out the resolution of G-SIFIs covered by the scheme 
would be expected to address the issues of impartiality and mistrust that 
all cross-border resolutions are bound to face due to the multitude of con-
flicting interests among creditor, shareholder, employee, and other stake-
holder groups as well protection of the national interest. It would also 
remedy the continuous absence of special resolution regimes dealing 
with SIFIs in several G-20 countries, which obliterates the intended ef-
fect of such regimes, namely the reduction of moral hazard associated 
with “too-big-to-fail” institutions.201 
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The global resolution authority could only operate effectively if 
participating countries and institutions accepted its power of intervention 
and attendant modifications of their domestic laws that would be re-
quired for the global resolution authority to operate a single resolution 
and insolvency law for G-SIFIs. Country members of the scheme could 
create a special statute that would exclusively apply (lex specialis) to the 
resolution of SIFIs.202 Moreover, all financial institutions supervised by 
the proposed scheme would have to amend their statutes to incorporate 
the changes necessitated by the single model operated by the global reso-
lution authority in order to minimize shareholder and creditor litigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Financial globalization coupled with a host of financial innovations 
led the world to the brink of collapse during the ongoing crisis and has 
pushed millions of the world’s least protected citizens to experience the 
consequences of a deep global recession in the form of job losses and 
rising economic hardship. As a result, the entire project of financial 
globalization is in peril, because it is impossible to sustain the current 
environment of open markets if another crisis of a similar magnitude as 
the last one occurs. In terms of global economic development, this is the 
worst time possible to return to a closed markets system. World require-
ments for credit and investment to finance development, sustainability, 
and increased food production needs are on the rise.203 These additional 
funds can only come from free and open global financial markets, not-
withstanding the need, in certain cases, for very short-term capital con-
trols in order to curb speculative capital flows. 
For all their excesses and sometimes even outright criminal behav-
ior, financial markets are one of the biggest stimulators of economic 
growth in the modern world, and they also have a serious impact on pov-
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erty reduction.204 The multitude of the complex challenges financial 
globalization creates may not be resolved without solid and effective su-
pranational regulatory structures governing global finance. This Article 
constitutes a comprehensive first attempt to provide such a model. 
The model of governance proposed in this Article as the template 
for an institutional “big bang” for global finance has the potential to 
prove a much better guardian of the global public good of systemic sta-
bility than national or regional regulators and the existing TRNs. In addi-
tion, the governance structure that is proposed here is based on a set of 
shared values (in the form of general principles and sub-principles of 
governance), which could not only secure its coherence but are also 
much more cognizant of an additional (to financial stability) global pub-
lic good: sustainable economic development! 
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